NEW JERSEY'S FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS STATUTE
-

TAKING A CLOSER LOOK
Maureen E. Garde *

I see something happening in our towns and in our neighborhoods. Sharp lawyers are running wild. Doctors are afraid to
practice medicine. And some moms and dads won't even
coach Little League any more .... I'm fighting to reform our

legal system, to put an end to crazy lawsuits.'
INTRODUCTION

In his acceptance speech, President Bush did not specify how
he intends to reform the legal system to "put an end to crazy
lawsuits." One approach to litigation reduction that has been
given a great deal of attention over the last decade is the enactment of statutes and court rules that penalize the assertion of
meritless legal claims and defenses. In the federal system, the
efforts at reform resulted in the adoption of amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In many states, so-called frivolous lawsuit statutes have been enacted.
In 1988, some three hundred years after the first legislative
attempt to control undesirable litigation,2 the New Jersey Legis* Counsel, New Jersey Law Revision Commission. J.D., Seton Hall University
School of Law 1978. The views expressed in this article are those of its author and
do not represent those of the New Jersey Law Revision Commission.
The author wishes to thank her husband Mark K. Lipton and her son, Matthew
B.G. Lipton, for their invaluable support in the completion of this article. She also
wishes to thank their friends Harry and Sally for their unique contribution to the
true spirit of frivolity.
I President George Bush's Republican PresidentialNomination Acceptance Speech, N.Y.
TIMES, August 21, 1992, at A14, col. 4.
2 The East Jersey Assembly of 1686 adopted a statute to inhibit nonresidents
from bringing "groundless and vexatious suits" against its residents, and the same
legislative body also adopted an elaborate provision regulating the allowance of

costs in lawsuits relative to the amount of a party's recovery. JoHN E. POMFRET, THE
PROVINCE OF EAST NEWJERSEY 1609-1702, 167, 170 (Octagon Books 1980). See also
An Act for preventing Multiplicity of Law-Suits, 5 May 1722, 2 Laws of the Royal
Colony of New Jersey 1703-1745 (1977, Bernard Bush, compiler) (reciting in the
preamble that there have been "Many Vexatious Suits... brought by Troublesome
and Litigious Persons," and providing for final adjudication of suits involving
debts); An Act respecting the court of chancery, Passed the 13th of June 1799, Pat.
L. 428, 433 secs. xxiv. to xxviii. (assessing costs against defendants filing insufficient answers); The 1912 NewJersey Practice Act, L. 1912, p. 377, 384, Schedule A,
Rule 19 ("Allegations or denials, made without reasonable cause, and found un-
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lature enacted the New Jersey frivolous claims statute.3 The statute authorizes courts to award "all reasonable litigation costs and
reasonable attorney fees" to a prevailing party in a civil action.4
An award of fees and costs is discretionary if a judge finds that a
party's position was advanced "in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury" or if the judge
finds that "[t]he nonprevailing party knew, or should have
known, that the complaint was without any reasonable basis in
law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argu'5
ment for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."
The New Jersey statute has been widely regarded as being
based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (Rule 11), which
true, shall subject the party pleading the same to the payment of such reasonable
expenses, to be taxed by the court, as may have been necessarily incurred by the
other party, by reason of such untrue pleading.").
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1 (West Supp. 1991).
4 The full text of the statute states:
a. A party who prevails in a civil action, either as plaintiff or defendant, against any other party may be awarded all reasonable litigation costs and reasonable attorney fees, if the judge finds at any
time during the proceedings or upon judgment that a complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim or defense of the nonprevailing person
was frivolous.
b. In order to find that a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense of the nonprevailing party was frivolous, the judge shall find
on the basis of the pleadings, discovery, or the evidence presented
that either:
(1) The complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense was commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose
of harassment, delay or malicious injury; or
(2) The nonprevailing party knew, or should have known, that the
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense was without
any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law.
c. A party seeking an award under this section shall make application
to the court which heard the matter. The application shall be supported by an affidavit stating in detail:
(1) The nature of the services rendered, the responsibility assumed, the results obtained, the amount of time spent by the
attorney, any particular novelty or difficulty, the time spent and
services rendered by secretaries and staff, other factors pertinent in the evaluation of the services rendered, the amount of
the allowance applied for, an itemization of the disbursements
for which reimbursement is sought, and any other factors relevant in evaluating fees and costs; and (2) How much has been
paid to the attorney and what provision, if any, has been made
for the payment of these fees in the future.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-59.1 (West Supp. 1991).
5 N.J. Stat. § 2A:15-59.1(b)(1) and (2) (West Supp. 1991).
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was amended in 1983 to increase the availability of sanctions for
dilatory and abusive tactics in federal court litigation.6 This view,
however, is incorrect. 7 Although the statute and the rule share
some common language and a common general purpose of discouraging unmeritorious litigation, they derive from fundamentally different sources. The federal rule's source is found in the
practice and procedure of the English equity courts.8 The New
Jersey frivolous claims statute, first proposed in bill form in
1982, 9 was patterned after the Wisconsin frivolous claims statute
enacted in 1977.'0 The Wisconsin statute, and other similar state
statutes, are derived from the common law torts of malicious use
of process and malicious abuse of process.'" The Wisconsin stat6 Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, Note of 1983 to Amended FED. R.
Civ. P. 11. Expressions of the view that the New Jersey statute is derivative of the
federal rule may be found in Iannone v. McHale, 245 N.J. Super. 17, 25, 583 A.2d
770 (App. Div. 1990); Evans v. The Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance
Co., 233 N.J. Super. 652, 664, 559 A.2d 888, 894 (Law Div. 1989); Gary D. Nissenbaum and Nancy Lem, Stop, Look and Listen: Selected Defenses to the New Jersey Frivolous
Lawsuit Statute, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 184 (1989) (passim); Tracy Schroth, Frivolous
Suit Bill is a Serious Possibility, 121 N.J.L.J. 877 (May 5, 1988).
7 The confusion over the New Jersey statute's source may have arisen because
of the six-year lapse between the first introduction of the bill proposing the statute
in 1982 and its ultimate passage in 1988. In the intervening years a great deal of
interest was focused on the 1983 amendments to Rule 11, generating in turn an
enormous amount of commentary and scholarly study. A partial bibliography of
pre-1990 sources may be found in Rule 11 In Transition: the Report of the Third
Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
8 D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking"
Problems with FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11, [hereinafter Risinger, Honesty in Pleading] 61 MINNESOTA L. REV. 1 (1977).

9 A.2012, 200th Leg., 1st N.J. Sess. (1982).
10 L. 1977, c. 209, § 1, as amended by 1987 Act 256, § 16. Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 814.025 (West Supp. 1991); see also infra note 54 (providing the full text of the
Wisconsin statute). That the Wisconsin statute was the model for the New Jersey
statute constitutes a qualified statement made following diligent inquiry into the
legislative history of the New Jersey enactment and comparison of the New Jersey
statute with other states' frivolous claims statutes. There is no explicit reference to
the Wisconsin statute in the available legislative materials, but comparison of the
two statutes' provisions supports the conclusion that the Wisconsin statute served
to some extent as a template for the drafting of the New Jersey statute. In addition,
there is no indication in the available materials that Federal Rule 11 was used as a
drafting model, or that it was considered in the course of legislative proceedings
regarding the bills. The federal rule's language is sufficiently dissimilar from both
the Wisconsin statute and the New Jersey statute (apart from other dissimilarities)
to lead to the conclusion that the New Jersey statute was not "patterned after" Rule
11. The source of the Rule 11 comparison may be a newspaper article published
shortly after the passage of A. 1316/A.751, which states that the wording of the bill
"closely resembles" the federal rule and makes further comparisons between the
bill and the rule. See Schroth, supra note 6.
ii See RONALD E. MALLEN AND VICTOR B. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 41 at 89
(2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter MALLEN & LEVIT] (frivolous claims statutes "have re-
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ute's language is drawn from the provisions of the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility promulgated by the American Bar
Association (ABA) in 1970.12
It is essential to establish the derivation of the New Jersey
statute because the assumption that the New Jersey statute was
"patterned after" or should be "read in light of" Rule 11 has led
some New Jersey courts to ignore the statute's important legislative history and misconstrue its provisions.' 3 In addition, since
the adoption of the 1947 state constitution, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has divided all enactments into two parts: those
that are "substantive," and therefore properly within the legislative sphere, and those that are "procedural" and therefore exclusively within the supreme court's rulemaking authority. 14 The
court has expressly held that awards of attorney fees are "procedural," and therefore, as a matter of constitutional law, governed
by court rule. In the exercise of its constitutionally-based
rulemaking authority, the court also has consistently refused to
adopt a court rule that would generally penalize the assertion of
suited from a dissatisfaction with the limited and often unavailable remedy of the
tort of malicious prosecution"). As of 1982, when the first bill proposing the New
Jersey statute was introduced, six states, in addition to Wisconsin, had enacted frivolous claims statutes. The NewJersey statute's language is strikingly similar to that
of the Wisconsin statute, but markedly dissimilar from that in the other six statutes.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-341.01(C) (West 1992) (award of reasonable attorney fees "upon clear and convincing evidence that the claim or defense constitutes harassment, is groundless and not made in good faith"); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-17-101 to -106 (West 1989) (award of attorney fees for claim found to be
"substantially frivolous, substantially groundless, or substantially vexatious"); FIA.
STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West Supp. 1991) (award of reasonable attorney fees where
court finds "complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact"); IDAHO
CODE § 12-121 (reasonable attorney fees may be granted to the prevailing party in
any civil action); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 231, § 6F (West 1985) (claims which are
"wholly insubstantial, frivolous and not advanced in good faith" subject to sanction); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.21 (West 1988) (costs and attorney fees available if
party "acted in bad faith; asserted a claim or defense that is frivolous and that is
costly to the other party; asserted an unfounded position solely to delay the ordinary course of the proceedings or to harass; or committed a fraud upon the court").
A list of state frivolous claims statutes and related court rules as of 1990 may be
found in N.Y. State Bar Association, Report of Special Committee to ConsiderSanctionsfor
Frivolous Litigation in New York State Courts, March 20, 1990, 18 FORDHAM URBAN L.J.
3, 34-42 (1990).
12 See infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
I3 See infra notes 131-220 and accompanying text.
14 See Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 255, 74 A.2d 406, 414 (1950) ("the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court is not subject to overriding legislation, but...
it is confined to practice, procedure and administration as such"), discussed more
fully infra at notes 223-32 and accompanying text.
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"frivolous claims."' 5 The court has upheld awards of attorney
fees as an element of damages in certain common law tort actions, however, despite the existence of a court rule that prohibits awards of attorney fees unless specifically authorized by
statute, court rule or contract.' 6 Given the constitutional dimension that the New Jersey Supreme Court has accorded the substance/procedure distinction, whether the statute is viewed as
deriving from a state statute intended to broaden a common law
tort or whether it derives from a federal procedural rule may
have a significant influence on the court's determination of
whether the statute impinges on its rulemaking prerogatives. In
addition, the fact that some of the language defining a frivolous
claim ultimately derives from a rule governing attorney conduct
may influence the court's view as to whether the statute transgresses its exclusive authority over the discipline of attorneys.
This Article's first and second parts will examine the New
Jersey statute's common law and legislative antecedents and the
history of its passage through the New Jersey Legislature. The
common law antecedents include the causes of action for malicious use of process and malicious abuse of process. The legislative antecedents include the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Wisconsin frivolous claims statute, which
incorporated the ABA provisions. This Article will also contrast
Federal Rule 11 with the Wisconsin statute and will explain the
use to which Rule 11 jurisprudence has been put in interpreting
the NewJersey statute. The third part of this Article will examine
the reported decisions that have construed the frivolous claims
statute to demonstrate the extent to which the confusion over the
statute's source has led some courts astray in their analyses of its
applicability. Finally, having set forth the history and extant constructions of the statute, the last part will discuss the issues that
the statute raises under the New Jersey Constitution, and the approaches that the New Jersey Supreme Court might take in determining whether to hold the statute constitutional.
I.
A.

THE COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATIVE ANTECEDENTS OF THE
NEW JERSEY FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS STATUTE

Malicious use of process and malicious abuse of process
The common law recognizes two torts stemming from the
15 See infra notes 213-258 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 239-245 and accompanying text.
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institution or use of civil litigation - malicious use of process
and malicious abuse of process.' 7 These torts are frequently confused, but they are quite distinct in their definitions of tortious
conduct.
The wrongful institution of civil proceedings, i.e., malicious
use of process, occurs when a party commences civil proceedings
"without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other than
that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the
proceedings are based.... "'i The purpose element is the "malice" in the tort of malicious use of process, i.e., a purpose other
than the adjudication of the claim such as hostility or ill will, harassment, forcing a settlement of a nuisance suit or a filing of a
counterclaim solely to delay the adjudication of a plaintiff's complaint.' 9 The tort's threshold element, however, is the absence of
probable cause for the initiation of the proceeding. If probable
cause exists, there is no liability for the institution of the proceeding, even if the instituting party possessed an improper
20
motive.

The term "probable cause" refers to the factual and legal
bases for a party's claim. 2 1 A party must "reasonably believe[] in
the existence of the facts" underlying his claim and must "reasonably believe[] that under those facts the claim may be valid
under the applicable law ....
A party, however, may satisfy
the obligation of reasonable belief in the claim's legal validity by
relying in good faith on an attorney's advice "after full disclosure
of all relevant facts within his knowledge and information" to the
"22

17 Malicious use of the process is sometimes referred to as "malicious prosecution," but, strictly speaking, "malicious prosecution" refers only to criminal prosecutions. J.D. LEE AND BARRY A. LINDAHL, 3 MODERN TORT LAw-LIABILITY AND
LITIGATION § 40.01 at 438-39 (Revised edition 1990) [hereinafter MODERN TORT
LAW]. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS identifies two torts arising out of civil
proceedings: "wrongful institution of civil proceedings" and "wrongful use of civil
proceedings," which correspond to the common law torts of malicious use of the
process and malicious abuse of process, respectively. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 674-682 (1977). The term "wrongful prosecution of criminal proceedings" is the term used for malicious prosecution. Id. at §§ 653-671. Throughout
this article, the terms "malicious use of the process" and "malicious abuse of process" will refer to the wrongful institution of civil proceedings and wrongful use of
civil proceedings, respectively, while the term "malicious prosecution" will be used
only in reference to the common law tort of wrongful institution of criminal
proceedings.
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674(a) (1977).

19 See id. at § 676 (1977).
20 Id. at § 668 cmt. b., § 669 & § 676 cmt. a.

21 Id. at § 662 & 675.
22 Id. at § 675.
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attorney.2 - Therefore, a party may be immunized from liability
for malicious use of process if the party relies on the advice of
counsel as to the existence of the legal aspect of probable
24

cause.

The attorney, in turn, is generally not liable for the tort of
malicious use of process for rendering advice to a client even if it
is later determined that probable cause was lacking. 25 In practice, therefore, the attorney backstops the client's tort liability
while not subjecting himself to liability for malicious use of process if the advice concerning the legal viability of a client's claim

was incorrect.2 6
Obtaining recovery for the tort of malicious use of process is
very difficult. A separate action must be brought, and the plaintiff has the burden of proving all of the tort's elements. The
plaintiff must have been a prevailing party in the underlying proceeding 27 and must show that the nonprevailing party in that proceeding did not have probable cause to bring it. Thus, even if a
party prevails in the underlying action, if the nonprevailing party
had probable cause to bring it, the tort action fails. In addition,
the prevailing party must show that the nonprevailing party harbored a "malicious purpose," i.e., "a purpose other than the adjudication of the underlying claim" in bringing the underlying
action. The nonprevailing party's purpose is judged by a subjective standard, which places upon the prevailing party the task of
23 Id.

24 Id. at §§ 666 and 675(b). Section 666 sets forth the conditions for appropriate reliance: The attorney consulted must be one admitted to practice in the state
in which the proceedings are brought and one whom the client has no reason to
believe has a personal interest in the proceedings. Furthermore, the reliance upon
the attorney's advice must be in good faith and after full disclosure of the facts
known to the client. Subsection (2) of section 666 states a slightly different rule if
the advice is sought from an attorney not admitted to practice in the jurisdiction.
25 Id. at § 653, cmt. h. (1977). The attorney may be liable if the attorney has a
personal interest in the action, but in a civil case a contingent fee agreement with a
client does not constitute a sufficient personal interest to justify the imposition of
liability on the attorney. Id. at § 675 cmt. h. On this point, see generally MALLEN &
LEVIT, supra note 11, Chapter 4, §§ 40-68 (2d ed. 1981).
26 See MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 11 § 56 at 117-18 (stating general rule "that
unless the attorney knows that the client's representations are false, he may rely
upon those statements as a basis for exercising his judgment and advice" and observing "that an attorney need not verify or investigate the truthfulness of the client's representations"). See also id. § 53 at 112-113 (explaining that the probable
cause standard for an attorney is less stringent than for a client).
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977).
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proving the nonprevailing party's state of mind.28 Finally, even if
these elements of the tort are established, in a minority of states,
including New Jersey, the attorney fees and litigation costs expended by the prevailing party in the underlying litigation are
not considered a proper element of damages in an action for malicious use of process. 29 The prevailing party must be able to
show some special damage beyond the expenditure for the defense of the underlying action. 0 In this minority ofjurisdictions
the requirement of "special damage" is an additional reason that
the tort is of little use to a person who has been subjected to
unmeritorious litigation - in most cases the expenditure of attorney fees and litigation costs are the only damages suffered,
even though they may be considerable. 3
The tort of malicious abuse of process is related to the tort
of malicious use of process, and presents equally difficult
problems of recovery. The tort is "the misuse of the process"
and exists if a party "uses a legal process, whether criminal or
civil, against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which
it is not designed ...."32 Unlike the wrongful institution of civil
proceedings, this tort assumes that the underlying proceeding is
properly brought - well grounded in fact and law and brought
for a legitimate purpose. 3 If a properly brought proceeding is
also used for a purpose outside the proceeding itself, a cause of
action exists. A classic example is the use of a legitimate debt
collection proceeding as a tactic to compel the defendant to pay a
debt other than the one for which the proceeding was brought.3 4
It is important to distinguish between the use of process to obtain payment of the debt in the underlying proceeding, which is
proper use of process, and the use of process to obtain payment
of a different debt, which is an improper use of process.3 5 The
"process" that may be abused is a broad concept, and includes
process that issues in the course ofjudicial proceedings, such as a
writ of garnishment or attachment, an arrest warrant, an order to
28 Malicious purpose may sometimes be inferred from the lack of probable
cause. See id. at § 676; MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 11, at § 59 at 123.
29 MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 11, at § 60; The Penwag Property Co., Inc. v.
Landau, 76 N.J. 595, 598, 388 A.2d 1265, 1266 (1978).
30 Id.
31 See, e.g.,
The Penwag Property Co., Inc. v. Landau, 76 N.J. 595, 600, 388 A.2d
1265, 1267 (1978) (Pashman, J., concurring).
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 & cmt. a (1977).
33 Id.
34 Id. at illustration 2.
35 See MALLEN & LEVIT, supra note 11, at § 61 at 131-33.
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show cause or a subpoena.3 6
The "malice" in the tort of malicious abuse of process must
be distinguished from the "malice" that is present in the tort of
malicious use of process. The malice in malicious abuse of process is the improper use of a properly-brought proceeding,
rather than malice in the sense of spite or ill will. 3 7 Whether the

proceeding is being used improperly is determined by an objective standard. Thus, the element of malice in this tort is judged
quite differently from the element of malice in the tort of malicious use of process.3 8 From the point of view of the person
seeking recovery, malicious abuse of process suffers from the
same procedural defects as malicious use of process. A separate
action must be brought, and all of the 39elements of the tort must
be proven in the separate proceeding.
Dissatisfaction with the recovery available under the common law torts of malicious use of the process and malicious
abuse of the process has been one of the factors that has
prompted state legislatures to enact frivolous claims statutes.4 °
These statutes are designed to expand the existing common law
remedies that may be used by a party subjected to unmeritorious
litigation.
B.

The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and its
successor, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility
The drafters of the Wisconsin frivolous claims statute used
language from the attorney disciplinary rules to define a "frivolous" claim under the statute. The drafters used language derived from the now-superseded Model Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated by the ABA in 1970."' The precise
source of the language used in the Wisconsin statute is DR 7-102,
36

Id.

37 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 100

at 668 (2d
ed. 1955).
38 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977).
39 Id.
40 See MALLEN & LEvrr, supra note 11, at § 41; accord Robert D. Sundby, Awarding
Reasonable Attorney Fees, 53 WISCONSIN BAR BULLETIN 11, 13-14 (May 1980) (hereinafter Sundby); Jay W. Endress, Comment, Is Wisconsin's Frivolous Claim Statute Frivolous? A Critical Analysis of Wis. Stat. § 814.025, 68 MARQUETrE L. REV. 279 (1984)
(hereinafter Endress).
41 American Bar Association, Report of the Special Committee on Evaluation of
Ethical Standards, 94 Annual Report 728 (1970). The Model Code was superseded
in 1983 by the adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. See
American Bar Association, Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards, 107 Annual Report 828 (1982).
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which defines an attorney's responsibility to represent a client
"within the bounds of the law." DR 7-102(A)(1) enjoins an attorney from acting on a client's behalf "when he knows or when it is
obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another. '4 2 DR 7-102(A)(2) directs an attorney
not to advance "knowingly" a legal position, on behalf of a client,
that is either "unwarranted under existing law" or that cannot be
"supported by good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."14 3 Subsections (A)(4), (5) and (6)
prohibit an attorney from engaging in falsity as to fact or law in
representing a client.44 It is subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2) of DR
42 As others have pointed out, the Model Code is not a model of clarity in setting a standard for attorney conduct. See, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 3.1:102 (2d ed., Supp. 1991) (hereinafter LAW OF LAWYERING); Risinger, Honesty in Pleading,supra note 8 at 52-58 & notes 178 & 185. It is
not at all clear, for example, just what kind of action on behalf of a client is encompassed in the phrase "an action which would serve merely to harass or maliciously
injure another." At first glance, the references to harassment and malice intimate
that the client's purpose in taking an action is relevant, but the phrasing of the
entire subsection suggests otherwise. The subsection focuses on the consequences
of "the action;" the rule contains no mention of the client. This focus suggests that
the rule requires an objective determination of the consequences of "the action,"
as the action itself cannot have a subjective purpose. It also seems unlikely that this
provision is intended to direct an attorney to inquire into the client's subjective
state of mind. See EC 7-6, which states that "[in many cases a lawyer may not be
certain as to the state of mind of his client, and in those situations he should resolve
reasonable doubts in favor of his client." DR 7-102(A)(l) may simply enjoin an
attorney taking action on behalf of a client that amounts to malicious abuse of
process.
43 The full text of these two subsections provides:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:
(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial,
or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or
when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another.
(2) Knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted
under existing law, except that he may advance such claim or
defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
The language of subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2) is repeated in DR 2-109 with respect
to the standard for acceptance of employment by an attorney. DR 2-109 prohibits a
lawyer from accepting employment in the first instance in which the client wishes to
"bring a legal action, conduct a defense, or assert a position in litigation, or otherwise have steps taken for him, merely for the purpose of harassing or maliciously
injuring any person," or in which the client seeks to "present a claim or defense in
litigation that is not warranted under existing law, unless it can be supported by
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."
44 DR 7-102, subsection (A)(4) mandates that an attorney may not "[k]nowingly
use perjured testimony or false evidence"; subsection (A)(5) provides that an attorney may not "[kinowingly make a false statement of law or fact" and subsection
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7-102 that are transmuted
into a definition of frivolousness in the
45
Wisconsin statute.

These Model Code provisions do not set a high standard of
attorney conduct in evaluating the basis for a claim that a client
wishes to assert or an action that a client wishes to take. Under
DR 7-102(A)(2), an attorney is merely enjoined from bringing a
claim that the attorney knows is without legal basis, while DR 7102(A)(4),(5) and (6) prohibit an attorney from knowingly using
false evidence. Significantly, the Model Code does not impose a
duty on attorneys to investigate the legal or the factual basis for a
client's claim. A similarly low standard defines the attorney's obligation under DR 7-102(A)(1) to evaluate whether an action
taken on behalf of a client "would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another" - the standard is whether an attarney
"knows," or whether "it is obvious, that an action would have
this effect." ' 46 Under the Model Code, therefore, an attorney
does not have a professional responsibility to act as a gatekeeper
to affirmatively prevent the assertion of unmeritorious claims.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct, promulgated in
1982, changed the standard for attorney evaluation of a client's
claim. The equivalent provision of the Model Rules, RPC 3.1,
enjoins a lawyer from asserting a claim on behalf of a client "unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law." '47 By eliminating the language in the
(A)(6) declares that an attorney may not be involved in the creation or preservation
of false evidence.
45 The language of subsections (A)(1) and (2) of DR 7-102 is repeated in DR 2109 with respect to the standard for acceptance of employment by an attorney.
46 See LAw OF LAWYERING, supra note 42, at § 3.1:102.
47 The equivalent provisions of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
appear to set a higher standard in this regard than the superseded Model Code.
The equivalent provision to DR 7-102(A)(1) and (2) is R.P.C. 3.1, entitled "Meritorious Claims and Contentions," provides in pertinent part: "A lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there
is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for
an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." The term "frivolous" generally pertains to a claim that has a factual basis but is legally insufficient on its face.
See, e.g., National Surety Co. v. Mulligan, 105 N.J.L. 336, 146 A.2d 372 (1928), but
the Model Code Comparison to this rule, however, indicates that the term is intended to include both "improper conduct," as described in DR 7-102(A)(1) (the
assertion of a claim "merely to harass or maliciously injure another"), as well as the
assertion of a claim not well-founded in law as described in DR 7-102(A)(2).
The Comment to the rule states that an action is "not frivolous merely because
the facts have not first been fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to
develop vital evidence only by discovery." Thus, it appears that an action is frivo-
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source provision requiring an attorney to "know" that a claim is
intended to harrass or is without legal basis, the Model Rule substitutes an objective standard of evaluation of attorney conduct
for the subjective standard of evaluation in the parent provision.
In this respect, the Model Rule is more stringent than the parent
provision because it eliminates an attorney's potential defense
that the attorney acted ignorantly but in good faith in asserting a
claim.4 The commentary to the Rule undercuts the elimination
of the subjective standard, however, as it provides that the assertion of a claim "is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes
that the client's position ultimately will not prevail."
Model Rule 3.1 also lacks clarity in defining those claims that
should not be asserted on behalf of a client. The use of the single term "frivolous" collapses the separate categories of improper purpose under DR 7-102(A)(1) and legal baselessness
under DR 7-102(A)(2). The Model Code comparison to the Rule
indicates that it is "to the same general effect" as DR 7102(A)(1), and it encompasses DR 7-102(A)(2) as well. This use
of the term "frivolous" in RPC 3.1 to encompass both categories
of conduct defined in the predecessor rule is not consistent with
its traditional legal usage. The term "frivolous" has been held to
refer to a pleading that was based in fact but that did not, on its
face, present a legally cognizable claim. 49 The term did not traditionally encompass a pleading that presented a legally cognizable
was false in fact; such pleadings were defined as
claim that
"sham. ' 50 It appears from the commentary to RPC 3.1 that it
was intended to cover at least some factually baseless claims. According to the Comment to RPC 3.1, a client's claim "is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully
substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery."
lous under R.P.C. 3.1 if it is deficient either legally or factually, or if it "will serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure." The Comment's language, however, appears to broaden the DR 7-102(A)(1) source language from the objectively judged
effect of an action ("would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure") to encompass the assertion of claims intended to harass or maliciously injure. The Comment
declares that an "action is frivolous ...if the client desires to have the action taken
primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person" (emphasis
added). This language suggests that an attorney has an obligation not to bring a
claim on behalf of a client even if it is legally and factually grounded, if the client's
purpose is to harass or maliciously injure. For a discussion of this issue, see LAw or
LAWYERING, supra note 42, at § 3.1:102.
48 See LAw OF LAWYERING, supra note 42, at § 3.1:301.
49 See, e.g.,
National Surety Co.v. Mulligan, 105 N.J.L. 336, 146 A.2d 372 (1928)
50 Id.
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The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct in 1984 after study and modification, including a change in the language of RPC 3. L.5 The New

Jersey version of RPC 3.1 enjoins a lawyer from bringing a proceeding "unless the lawyer knows or reasonably believes that
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous."

The rein-

troduction of the qualifying language concerning the merits of a
client's claim appears to strike a middle ground between the objective standard in the ABA's version of RPC 3.1 and the com-

pletely subjective standard of the predecessor Model Code
provision.
C.

The Wisconsin frivolous claims statute

The enactment of the Wisconsin frivolous claims statute was
motivated by a specific concern with an increase in baseless professional malpractice claims, although the statute is not limited to
such claims. 5 2 The purpose of the statute is to penalize the assertion of groundless claims and furnish "a remedy for litigants who
have been injured by frivolous suits" by mandating an award of
attorney fees and costs to a party who has successfully defended a
claim found to be "frivolous" as defined in the statute.5 3 The
definition of the term "frivolous" in subsections (3)(a) and (3)(b)
of the statute was derived from subsections (A)(1) and (A)(2) of
DR 7-102 and DR 2-109, respectively.5 4
The statute makes significant changes in the language of the
disciplinary rules, and expressly subjects attorneys and their clients to expanded liability for the assertion of frivolous claims.5 5
Subsection (3)(a) of the statute provides that an award of reason51 SYLVIA PRESSLER, RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF NEW JERSEY

304 (1993

ed.).

See Sundby, supra note 40 at 13-14; Endress, supra note 40, at 279-85.
See In re Estate of Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 351, 302 N.W.2d 508, 514 (Ct. App.
1981).
54 See Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 794 n.4, 299 N.W. 2d 856, 680 n.4
52
53

(1981); Endress, supra note 40, at 304-09. In 1975, Governor PatrickJ. Lucey ve-

toed the first effort at passage of a frivolous claims statute in Wisconsin. The Governor objected to the standard of frivolousness, i.e, a claim " 'not honestly
debatable under law' " because it was unclear; he recommended a "more specific,
narrower definition." See Sundby, supra note 40 at 13-14. The language to which
the Governor objected was drawn from the oath of office taken by Wisconsin attorneys upon admission to the Bar. See In re Lauer, 108 Wis. 2d 746, 759, 324 N.W.2d
432, 439 (1982).
55 The sponsor of the bill in the legislature expressly directed that the include
authority to assess fees against a party's attorney " 'as an additional penalty.' " See
Sundby, supra note 40, at 14.
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able litigation costs and attorney fees shall be made "to the successful party" if a court finds that a proceeding was "frivolous"
defined as a claim that "was commenced, used or continued in
bad faith, solely for purposes of harassing or maliciously injuring
another."' 56 Subsection (3)(b) states that an award may also be
made "to the successful party" if the party who asserted a claim
or that party's attorney "knew, or should have known," that the
proceeding was "frivolous" in that it "was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." '5 7 Because the standard is stated in the disjunctive,
the assertion of a claim is frivolous if either of the two prongs of
the statutory standard is satisfied.
An overall broadening of attorney and client liability for
wrongful institution of civil proceedings results from the transmutation of the disciplinary rule provisions into the statute. 58
§ 814.025(3)(a) (West Supp. 1991).
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 814.025(3) (West Supp. 1991). The statute's full text
provides:
(1) If an action or special proceeding commenced or continued by a
plaintiff or a counterclaim, defense or cross complaint commenced, used or continued by a defendant is found, at any time
during the proceedings or upon judgment, to be frivolous by the
court, the court shall award to the successful party costs determined under s. 814.04 and reasonable attorney fees.
(2) The costs and fees awarded under sub. (1) may be assessed fully
against either the party bringing the action, special proceeding,
cross complaint, defense or counterclaim or the attorney representing the party or may be assessed so that the party and the
attorney each pay a portion of the costs and fees.
(3) In order to find an action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or cross complaint to be frivolous under sub. (1), the court
must find one or more of the following:
(a) The action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or
cross complaint was commenced, used or continued in bad
faith, solely for purposes of harassing or maliciously injuring
another.
(b) The party or the party's attorney knew, or should have known,
that the action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or
cross complaint was without any reasonable basis in law or
equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument
for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
(4) To the extent s. 802.05 is applicable and differs from this section,
s. 802.05 applies.
The Wisconsin statute was supplemented in 1983 by the addition of a separate
statute imposing sanctions on frivolous appeals. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 809.25(3)
(West Supp. 1992).
58 That an attorney's liability under the statute is greater than the statute's disciplinary rule analogs is apparent from distinction the Wisconsin courts have drawn
56 WIS. STAT. ANN.
57
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Subsection (3)(b) substitutes the phrase "without any reasonable
basis in law or equity" for the phrase "unwarranted under existing law" in DR 7-102(A)(2). This change in phrasing has had
the effect, whether intended or not, 59 of broadening this subsection's scope from the disciplinary rule's focus on the legal basis
for a claim to an evaluation of both the legal and the factual basis
for the claim.6' The statute also replaces the subjective, "knowingly" standard of the rule with an objective, "knew or should
have known" standard. 6 The subsection's scope has been further broadened by judicial decisions that have interpreted the
statute as imposing on attorneys and parties an affirmative duty
of investigation as to a claim's factual and legal bases. 62
in attorney disciplinary proceedings that are based upon awards under the frivolous
claims statute. A few years after the statute was enacted the Board of Attorneys of
Professional Responsibility issued a notice to the bar warning that the Board would
investigate cases in which sanctions were awarded under the frivolous claims statute. In In re Lauer, 108 Wis. 2d 746, 324 N.W.2d 432, 438 (1982), the court held
that an award of sanctions against an attorney under the frivolous claims statute's
subsection (3)(b) did not constitute a per se violation of the analogous disciplinary
rules upon which the statute was based. The court pointed out that while the subsection requires an evaluation of an attorney's conduct under an objective, "reasonable attorney" standard, the disciplinary rule assesses the same conduct
subjectively, and a violation occurs only if an attorney knowingly advanced a frivolous legal position. Further, the Lauer court stated that in a disciplinary proceeding
the attorney's subjective state of mind, i.e., whether the attorney knowingly advanced a claim that "was unwarranted under existing law and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law" comprises a question of fact which must be proved by "clear and
satisfactory evidence." Id. at 439. Consequently, a preponderance of the evidence
standard, as required for an award under the statute, does not apply.
59 The term "frivolous" generally pertains to a claim that is factually sound but
legally deficient on its face. See, e.g., National Surety Co. v. Mulligan, 105 N.J.L.
336, 146 A.2d 372 (1928). The phrase "unwarranted under existing law" in DR 7102(A)(2) pertained to the legal basis for a party's claim, while DR 7-102(A)(4), (5)
and (6) pertained to the factual basis for a party's claim. There does not appear to
be any indication in the Wisconsin statute's legislative history of the specific reason
for changing the phrase "unwarranted under existing law" to "without any reasonable basis in law or equity," language which does not manifest on its face an intention to encompass a claim's factual basis as well as its legal basis.
60 See, e.g., Radlein v. Indus. Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 629, 345
N.W.2d 874, 886 (1984) (legal theory found frivolous); Blankenship v. Computers
and Training, Inc., 158 Wis. 2d 702, 707-08, 462 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Ct. App. 1990)
(litigants and their attorneys have duty to investigate facts and law); Stoll v. Adriansen, 122 Wis. 2d 503, 513-14, 362 N.W.2d 182, 188 (Ct. App. 1984) (claim unsupported by facts found frivolous); In re Estate of Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 350, 302
N.W.2d 508, 514 (Ct. App. 1981) (claim unsupported by facts found frivolous).
61 E.g., Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 796-98, 299 N.W.2d 856, 859-60
(1981); Robertson-Ryan & Assoc., Inc. v. Pohlhammer, 112 Wis. 2d 583, 589, 334
N.W.2d 246, 250 (1983); Stoll v. Adriansen, 122 Wis. 2d 503, 514, 362 N.W.2d
182, 188 (Ct. App. 1984).
62 E.g., Radlein v. Indus. Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 629, 345
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In contrast to the broadening effect of the changes in subsection (3)(b), the changes in language from DR 7-102(A)(1) of the
disciplinary rule to subsection (3)(a) of the statute have had a
narrowing effect. The substitution of the phrase "in bad faith,
solely for purposes of harassing or maliciously injuring" in subsection (3)(a) of the statute for the phrase "would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injure" in DR 7-102(A)(1) substitutes a subjective measure of an individual's actual, harmful intent for the
objective evaluation of the propriety of "an action" in the source
rule.63
The simultaneous broadening of the definition of sanctionable conduct in subsection (3) (a) and the narrowing in subsection
(3)(b) has altered in a curious manner the relationship of the categories of conduct defined in the disciplinary rule. If a claim is
brought "solely" to harass or maliciously injure within the meaning of subsection (3)(a), 64 it will almost necessarily be found to
violate subsection (3)(b) as well, as a claim that is "without any
reasonable basis in law or equity."' 65 Because it is easier to show
that the objective standard of reasonableness under subsection
(3)(b) has been violated, it appears that subsection (3)(a) is suN.W.2d 874, 886 (1984) (statute requires investigation of facts and law by attorneys
and litigants); Stoll v. Adriansen, 122 Wis. 2d 503, 513, 362 N.W.2d 182, 187-88
(Ct. App. 1983) ("what a reasonable attorney or litigant would or should have
known with regard to the facts" constitutes a question of fact, while "the legal significance of those findings [of fact] in terms of whether knowledge of those facts
would lead a reasonable attorney or litigant to conclude the claim is frivolous,
presents a question of law").
63 Robertson-Ryan & Assoc., Inc. v. Pohlhammer, 112 Wis. 2d 583, 589, 334
N.W.2d 246, 250 (1983); Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 796-98, 299 N.W.2d
856, 857-58 (1981); Stoll v. Adriansen, 122 Wis. 2d 503, 514 n.5, 362 N.W.2d 182,
188 & n.5 (Ct. App. 1984).
64 Subsection (3)(a) has been held to require "a finding that the sole purpose of
the lawsuit was to harass the other party." Stoll v. Adriansen, 122 Wis. 2d 503, 514
n.5, 362 N.W.2d 182, 188 n.5 (Ct. App. 1983). In Stoll, the court reviewed an attorney fee award against the plaintiff homeowners in an action for negligent construction of a residence. The court held that the award was justified under subsection
(3)(b) because the trial record showed that the defendant builder used reasonable
care in constructing the residence and the plaintiffs had failed to adduce any evidence to support their theory that the defects in their home were caused by a lack
of ordinary care. Additionally, the court found that the plaintiffs had not violated
subsection (3)(a), because while harassment was the plaintiffs' "primary purpose,
they also sought a money judgment."
65 See Critical Analysis, supra note 40, at 289-90. See also First Federated Sav.
Bank v. McDonah, 143 Wis. 2d 429, 422 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding that
general denial filed in response to complaint for mortgage foreclosure in absence
of legal or factual defense to complaint and for admitted purpose of delay violates
(3)(b)). But see id. at 436-37, 422 N.W.2d at 116 (Sundby,J., dissenting) (suggesting
that groundless answer submitted for purposes of delay violates subsection (3)(a)).
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perfluous as it is effectively subsumed in subsection (3)(b). Thus
far, the cases decided under the Wisconsin statute bear out this
theory - in only one case has a court found that a claim was
asserted in violation of subsection (3)(a), and the court simultaneously found that subsection (3)(b) had been violated as well. 66
In addition to broadening the liability of attorneys and parties for bringing meritless civil cases, the Wisconsin statute also
makes it easier procedurally for a litigant to obtain relief, as compared to available tort remedies. Most importantly, the statute
uses the mandatory language "shall award." Thus, a party who is
"successful" with respect to a claim is entitled to an award of
attorney fees and costs if the claim is found to be frivolous. A
claim under the statute may be asserted by application to the
court that heard the underlying proceeding as part of the same
67
action, rather than by institution of a separate action.
The Wisconsin courts have placed some limitations on the
statute, however. In accordance with the language of the statute,
the courts have held that an award of costs and attorney fees may
be granted for the institution of a frivolous action or proceeding,
or the assertion of a frivolous counterclaim or defense, but not
for improper conduct in the course of a proceeding. 68 The person against whom an award is sought generally is entitled to a
hearing. 69 In fact, the Wisconsin appellate courts have mandated
a certain level of this kind of "satellite litigation" on due process
grounds to facilitate appellate review of statutory awards.70 The
66 In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Cairo, 115 Wis. 2d 5, 338 N.W.2d 703
(1983). The attorney, a 45-year member of the bar, was charged with multiple disciplinary rule infractions. Sanctions were imposed against the attorney under the
frivolous claims statute relating to cases that he either handled or personally filed.
The court did not distinguish between the two subsections of the statute, but did
refer to the counterpart provisions of the disciplinary rules. Such references indicate that the attorney was found to have brought claims that were without basis in
law or fact and with the purpose to harass or maliciously injure.
67 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 814.025(1) (West Supp. 1991).
68 See Gagnow v. Haase, 149 Wis. 2d 542, 439 N.W.2d 593 (Ct.App. 1989). The
Gagnow court explained that in a properly brought garnishment proceeding an attorney's violation of a statutory notice requirement in one aspect of the proceeding
did not permit an award under the frivolous claims statute because the underlying
garnishment action was meritorious and not frivolous. The court stated that the
frivolous claims statute "penalizes a plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney for bringing a
frivolous lawsuit; it does not penalize him or her for conduct in prosecuting an
otherwise meritorious action." Id. at 546, 439 N.W.2d at 595. The court failed to
discuss, however, whether such conduct might constitute an abuse of process.
69 See Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 793, 299 N.W.2d 856, 858 (1981).
70 Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 793, 299 N.W.2d 856, 858 (1981); see also
Blankenship v. Computers and Training, Inc., 158 Wis. 2d 702, 462 N.W.2d 918
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Wisconsin courts have recognized the danger inherent in sanctioning parties for claims later found to be without legal or factual basis. In Radlein v. Industrial Fire and Casualty Insurance Co. ,7
the Wisconsin Supreme Court balanced the public interest in
permitting attorneys to argue for change in the law against the
interests of litigants against whom arguably novel or groundbreaking claims are made.72 The test enunciated by the Radlein
court requires an attorney bringing such a claim to "be able to
argue in good faith that the law has reached such a point that it is
for extension, modification or for rejecready for consideration,
7 3
tion by reversal.

'

Neither reported decisions nor any study or commentary
reveals whether the Wisconsin frivolous claims statute has had
any appreciable effect on the incidence of frivolous claims. What
gives one pause, however, is that the reported cases evidence that
claims under the statute can take on a life of their own and may
breed as much litigation as the statute was designed to
suppress.
D.

The 1983 Amendment to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11
The same generalized concern over a perceived increase in

(Ct. App. 1990) (remanding matter for hearing on attorney's level of knowledge of
facts supporting client's claim); Wengerd v. Rinehart, 114 Wis. 2d at 582-85, 338
N.W.2d at 866-67 (declining to require hearing for determination of frivolousness
made on the basis of affidavits submitted with respect to a claim's merits, but remanding case for hearing on reasonableness of attorney fee award); In re Estate of
Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 355, 302 N.W.2d 508, 517 (Ct. App. 1981) (separate hearing held on frivolous claim application; court determined that "[t]o deny the party
or an attorney a hearing on the issue of frivolousness would raise a serious questions as to denial of due process").
71 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984).
72 The court enumerated a number of changes in the law for which attorney
advocacy had been responsible, commenting that "[flrivolous action claims are an
especially delicate area since it is here that ingenuity, foresightedness and competency of the bar must be encouraged and not stifled." 117 Wis. 2d at 613, 345
N.W.2d at 879.
73 Id. at 613, 345 N.W.2d at 879. The Radlein approach involves a two-pronged
test: first, is the law ready for extension, modification or reversal, and, if not, then
was the argument for such change made in good faith even though not successful.
117 Wis. 2d at 612, 345 N.W.2d at 878.
74 Stivarius v. DiVall, 121 Wis. 2d 145, 358 N.W.2d 530 (1984) in which the
Supreme Court remanded a six-year-old case involving a claim under the statute for
a third hearing on the frivolousness of the plaintiff's claims and the reasonableness
of the defendant's request for attorney fees. See also Johnson v. Calado, 159 Wis. 2d
446, 464 N.W.2d 647 (1991) (upholding the dismissal of a malicious prosecution
action stemming from a defamation suit that itself had already generated two applications for awards under the frivolous claims statute).
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litigation abuses that prompted the Wisconsin Legislature to enact a frivolous claims statute, and that ultimately would prompt
the New Jersey Legislature to do the same, manifested itself in
the federal system in the early 1980s. The Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure studied the problem and
in 1982 proposed a package of amendments "to reduce unnecessary delay and needless expense, as well as to increase efficiency,
in the administration of justice." ' 5 Included among the proposals was an amendment to Rule 11, which since 1938 had required
all pleadings filed in federal court to be signed by an attorney
who certified that "to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief" there was "good ground to support it." ' 76 Rule 11 as
amended in 1983 provides that the signature of an attorney or a
party on a pleading constitutes a certification:
[T]hat the signer has read the pleading, motion or other paper, that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation. 7 7
The first element of the Rule 11 standard requires a belief on
the part of the person signing that the pleading or other paper
which is being signed is grounded both in fact and in law, 78 a belief
that must have been formed "after reasonable inquiry. 79 In using
this language, the Rule's drafters intended to replace the standard
75 See, e.g., Memorandum from Hon. Walter R. Mansfield to Hon. Edward T.
Gignoux (March 9, 1982), 97 F.R.D. 190 (1982); Arthur R. Miller & Diana G. Culp,
Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted the New Rules of Civil Procedure, NATIONAL LAWJOURNAL,
Nov. 28, 1983, at 24; Richard L. Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential
Impact of the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATruRE
363 (1983).
76 For a thorough study of the history of Rule 11 and an analysis of the reasons
for its failure to serve as an effective remedy for litigation abuse, see Risinger, Honesty in Pleading, supra note 8.

77 FED.

R. Civ. P. 11.

78 These requirements are actually two separate elements in themselves, both of
which must be present for a pleading to satisfy Rule 11. William W. Schwarzer,
Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 186 (1985)
[hereinafter Schwarzer].
79 See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120 (1989)
(holding that the affirmative duty of inquiry is a non-delegable duty personal to the
signer); Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication Enterprises, Inc., 111
S.Ct. 922 (1991) (holding that a represented party who signs a pleading is subject
to Rule 11).
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of good faith belief in the grounds for the pleading with an objective
standard of reasonableness."0 The Rule also permits the submission
of papers that are grounded in "a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law," language drawn
from DR 7-102(A)(2). 8 In these elements Rule 1 1 is closely comparable to the standard set by subsection (3)(b) of the Wisconsin statute, but this is the extent of the essential similarities between the
two.
The Rule's second element is the absence of an "improper purpose" term, which is non-exclusively defined as including either harassment, delay or needless increase in litigation costs. The
language of this portion of the Rule is directed at evaluating the
"purpose" for which a pleading is submitted. It does not, however,
import a concept of malice or bad faith as those terms are understood in the context of malicious use of process actions or the Wisconsin frivolous claims statute.8 2 This language refers to whether a
particular pleading or paper was submitted to accomplish a legitimate purpose within the context of the litigation, measured by an
80 See Advisory Committee Note 1983 Amendment, FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
81 See Schwarzer, supra note 78, at 189-90.
82 This element of amended Rule 11 sounds very much like abuse of process, see
Schwarzer, supra note 78, at 185, but the judicial opinions do not interpret the rule
in such a fashion. A pleading or paper submitted for a purpose extraneous to the
litigation has been held not to violate the rule as long as the pleading or other
paper is grounded in fact and in law. For example, in a case involving a challenge
to election laws under the federal civil rights statutes by a group trying to prevent
the recall of the city councilman whom they supported, a federal circuit court stated
that "the political inspiration for the federal law suit does not necessarily mean that
the action is 'improper' within the meaning of Rule 11." Zaldivar v. City of Los
Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 834 (9th Cir. 1986). Similarly, another federal circuit court
vacated an award of Rule 11 sanctions in a case involving a dispute between two
labor unions in a union certification contest where one of the unions was found by
the lower court to have asserted a meritorious claim as a "campaign tactic." National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d
216, 223-24 (5th Cir. 1988).
This aspect of the rule is somewhat counterintuitive given its overall purpose.
Therefore, it is not surprising that some of the statements concerning the applicability of the rule's "improper purpose" prong have been contradictory as to
whether the submission of a pleading well grounded in fact and in law can be subject to sanctions. Judge Schwarzer's authoritative article on the federal rule contains conflicting statements on this point. Compare Schwarzer, supra note 78 ("the
rule teaches not only frivolous proceedings but also those which, although not
without merit, constitute an abuse of legal process because brought for an improper purpose such as causing harassment, unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation"), and id. at 195 ("The third prong is directed at papers
which, though not necessarily frivolous, are found to be interposed for an improper
purpose."), with id. at 196 ("If a reasonably clear legal justification can be shown for
the filing of the paper in question, no improper purpose can be found and sanctions are inappropriate.").
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objective standard.8 3
The Wisconsin statute and the federal rule are also dissimilar in
that the rule's primary focus is the behavior of attorneys in the conduct of litigation.84 Rule 11 is specifically directed at the signing of
pleadings, motions and other papers rather than at the assertion of
claims and defenses.8 5 Thus, an award of sanctions does not depend upon whether a party is successful on a claim or defense; indeed, a judge may impose sanctions sua sponte.86 Rule 11 does not
constitute a fee-shifting device and it is not concerned with recompensing parties for their expenses in defending against groundless
litigation. 87 A Rule 11 sanction may include an award of attorney
fees to a party, but it need not; a monetary penalty payable to the
court may be ordered.8 8 In fact, the primary purpose of the Rule
was recently defined by the United States Supreme Court as "curb'
ing abuses of the judicial system. 89
Rule 11 is also distinguishable from the Wisconsin statute in
that the Rule is enacted pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act which
provides that rules prescribed under the statute "shall not abridge,
83 Judge Schwarzer has analyzed judicial evaluation of "improper purpose" as
follows:
In considering whether a paper was interposed for an improper purpose, the court need not delve into the attorney's subjective intent.
The record in the case and all of the surrounding circumstances
should afford an adequate basis for determining whether particular
papers or proceedings caused delay that was unnecessary, whether
they caused increase in the cost of litigation that was needless, or
whether they lacked any apparent legitimate purpose. Findings on
these points would suffice to support an inference of an improper
purpose.
Schwarzer, supra note 78, at 186.
84 Rule 11 is expressly directed at the conduct of parties as well, and it has recently been held, over vigorous dissents, to apply to parties who sign pleadings,
motions or other papers even if the parties are represented by counsel. Business
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterp., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
That the rule extends to represented parties and pro se parties, however, does not
detract from the fact that Rule 11 is primarily directed at attorney conduct.
85 Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 814.025(1) (West Supp. 1991) ("[i]f an action or
special proceeding commenced or continued by a plaintiff or a counterclaim, defense or cross complaint . . . is found . . . to be frivolous"); Gagnow v. Haase, 149
Wis. 2d 542, 439 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1989) ("frivolous claims statute does not
penalize an attorney for conduct in prosecuting an otherwise meritorious action").
86 See Advisory Committee Note 1983 Amendment, FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
87 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 22 (1990). See also Business
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication Enter. Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922, 934 (1991)
(observing that "[t]he main objective of the Rule is not to reward parties who are
victimized by litigation").
88 See Advisory Committee Note 1983 Amendment, FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
89 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990).
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enlarge, or modify any substantive right."" This limitation on the
federal rule-making power confines Rule 11, in theory at least, to
the regulation of procedure, not the recognition or abrogation of
substantive rights. In sustaining the Rule's applicability to parties
who sign pleadings and other papers against the argument that such
a reading of the Rule would run afoul of this limitation, the
Supreme Court declared in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication Enterprises, Inc., that "It]here is little doubt that Rule 1 1 is reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of the system of federal
practice and procedure, and that any effect on substantive rights is
incidental."'" In comparison, the Wisconsin frivolous claims statute, like other similar statutes, provides a litigant with an affirmative
remedy for the damage caused by being subjected to an unmeritorious legal action. In effect the Wisconsin law creates a statutory tort,
not merely a procedural device for the use of courts in controlling
the conduct of litigation.9 2
The Advisory Committee endeavored to place some limits on
the imposition of sanctions under the newly-expanded Rule 11. The
Committee emphasized that the Rule "is not intended to chill an
attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories," and that a court should "avoid hindsight and should test the
signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the
time the pleading, motion or other paper was submitted."9 " The
Advisory Committee also suggested that determinations of the appropriateness of sanctions should be made, except in extraordinary
circumstances, on the record, "[t]o assure that the efficiencies
achieved through more effective operation of the pleading regimen
will not be offset by the cost of satellite litigation." 9 4
As amended, Rule 11 has generated enormous controversy and
disagreement as to whether its benefits outweigh its costs. 95 In response, the Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules released a re90 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (West Supp. 1992).
91 Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication Enter., Inc., I1IS. Ct.

922, 934 (1991).

92 See Sundby, supra note 40, at 13 (the Wisconsin frivolous claims statute "appears broad enough to encompass, as frivolous, action[s] satisfying the elements of
malicious prosecution or abuse of process").
93 Advisory Committee Note 1983 Amendment, FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
94 Id.
95 See, e.g., Georgene Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988);
William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (1988); Melissa L.
Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Lookingfor a Middle Ground on rule
11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383 (1990); AnnualJudicial Conference, SecondJudicial Circuit of the United States, Panel Presentation: The Lawyer At Risk, 139 F.R.D.
233, 243-83 (1990).
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port in August 1991 concluding that many criticisms of the
amended rule were valid and proposing major changes in its provisions.9 6 A reduction in the number of requests for Rule 11 sanctions is among the express purposes of the proposed
amendments .

II.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY9 8 OF THE NEW JERSEY FRIVOLOUS
CiAIMS STATUTE

General proposals to sanction unmeritorious civil litigation
have been introduced continuously in the New Jersey Legislature
since the late 1970s.9 9 The bill that was eventually enacted as the
New Jersey frivolous claims statute was first sponsored by Assemblywoman Maureen Ogden and Assemblyman Walter Kern in the
1982-83 legislative session. Before emerging in its final enacted
version four sessions later, the original proposal underwent several amendments incorporating, then deleting, provisions of rival
bills, as well as a conditional veto. The key issues addressed by
the Legislature were whether litigation costs and attorney fees
should be awarded to prevailing litigants, whether there should
be a dollar limit on awards of attorney fees and whether false
allegations of fact should be sanctionable under the statute.
The original Ogden bill, A.2012, closely paralleled the Wisconsin frivolous claims statute both in its language and structure
96 Proposed Rules, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 64-65
(1991). The proposed rule changes were approved by the Judicial Conference on
Sept. 22, 1992. If approved by the United States Supreme Court and Congress the
proposed rule changes will become effective no earlier than Dec. 1, 1993.
97 Id.
98 Generally, documentation concerning the proceedings of the New Jersey
Legislature is limited to bill drafts, unless legislative reports are prepared or formal
hearings are held. None of the informal committee hearings regarding the bills
preceding the enactment of the frivolous claims statute were transcribed and there
are no formal legislative reports available. The files of the Office of Governor's
Counsel on the two bills that reached Governor Kean's desk contain very helpful
information, however, and some of the material contained in the files is referred to
in the exhaustive discussion of the statute's legislative history. See infra notes 10219. The bill files are available in the New Jersey State Archive in Trenton, New
Jersey.
99 See, e.g., A.3125, 198th Leg., 1st Sess. (1978) (permitting an award of costs
and attorney fees to architects, engineers and land surveyors in certain kinds of
suits); A.229, 199th Leg., 1st Sess. (1980) (same); A.26, 200th Leg., 1st Sess. (1982)
(same); A.3928, 200th Leg., 1st Sess. (1982) (requiring courts to award attorney
fees and costs to certain nonprofit corporations defending frivolous lawsuits);
A.1005, 201th Leg., 1st Sess. (1984) (same); A.1443, 201th Leg., 1st Sess. (1984)
(permitting court to award attorney fees and costs to public entity or employee in
certain cases).
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of its provisions. The bill, however, provided for discretionary
rather than mandatory awards and the subsection expressly authorizing awards against attorneys as well as litigants was deleted. ° ° Although the bill substituted the phrase "not
substantially justified" for the term "frivolous" in the Wisconsin
statute, the respective definitions of the terms were virtually
identical.' 0 ' The ABA Disciplinary Rules were in force in New
Jersey at the time the bill was drafted and introduced, and thus
to
the proposed statute set a standard that was closely analogous
10 2
rules.
those
under
responsibility
professional
an attorney's
No action was taken on A.2012 in the 1982-83 session, nor
on the identical A.232, introduced in the 1984-85 session. 10 3 In
the 1986-87 session, the legislature finally turned its attention to
the idea of a frivolous claims statute. Assemblywoman Ogden's
bill was reintroduced as A. 1086, in identical form to its previous
100 A.2012, 200th Leg., 1st Sess. (1982). The Wisconsin statute provides that
awards "shall" be made when the statutory standard is met, while the New Jersey
statutes uses the discretionary "may award." The Wisconsin statute also includes
two additional subsections. Subsection 2 of the Wisconsin statute provides that
costs and fees may be assessed against an attorney, or a party, or may be allocated
between them. Subsection 4, added in 1987, cross references Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 814.025(4), the Wisconsin version of Rule 11, and states that to the extent that
that provision applies, it controls over the frivolous claims statute.
101 The phrase not "substantially justified" apparently was taken from the one of
the federal statutes that sanctions meritless claims, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). See
Letter from Assemblyman Walter M.D. Kern, Jr., to Governor Thomas H. Kean
(December 29, 1986) (commenting upon a later version of the bill, A. 1086, 202nd
Leg., 1st Sess. (1986)).
102 NewJersey Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102 (1990); see Sylvia B.
Pressler, RULES GOVERNING THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, comment at
201-104 and 201-25 [hereinafter Pressler]. In 1984, the New Jersey Supreme
Court adopted the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, with some amendments, including a modified version of R.P.C. 3. 1. See the discussion of R.P.C. 3. 1,
supra note 5 1.
103 The same session witnessed the introduction of a bill on the Senate side by
Senator Matthew Feldman. The Feldman bill differed in its structure and individual provisions from the Ogden bill, but set a quite similar frivolousness standard,
also closely based upon the language of DR 7-102. S.1190, 201st Leg., Ist Sess.
(1984). The Feldman bill defined a frivolous claim as one which was "instituted in
bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, malicious injury or delay," or one
which was "instituted without any reasonable basis in law or in fact upon which a
court may grant the claim for relief." The term "delay" in the Feldman bill is not
included in DR 7-102 or the Ogden bill; it may have been imported from New
Jersey Court Rule 4:46-5 which sanctions affidavits submitted "in bad faith or solely
for the purpose of delay." See discussion of this rule at infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text; see also Statement to S. 1190, 201 st Leg., ist Sess. (1984) (referring
to N.J. Ct. R. 4:46-6 as a source for one of the sections of the bill). The phrase
"unwarranted under existing law" in DR 7-102 appears in the Ogden bill as "without any reasonable basis in law or equity" and in the Feldman bill as "without any
reasonable basis in law or in fact."
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versions. 10 4 The bill was amended in committee to import into it
the provisions of a rival bill sponsored by Senator Matthew Feldman. 0 5 The combined bill reached Governor Thomas H. Kean's
desk in December 1986. As enacted by both houses, the bill was
similar to the original Ogden bill, with four significant elements
taken from the Feldman bill: allowance of litigation costs was
eliminated, the assertion of a claim or defense for the purpose of
"delay" was added to the list of sanctionable conduct, a separate
subsection setting forth a standard for the computation of attorney fee awards was added, and a cap of $2,500 on the amount of
awards was imposed. The combined bill sanctioned claims advanced in bad faith and those "instituted without any reasonable
basis in law or equity," the phraseology used in all of the previous Ogden bills.
Assemblywoman Ogden and Assemblyman Kern, the Chair
of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, were opposed to the
changes made by the Senate. Both requested that the Governor
conditionally veto the bill. Assemblyman Kern's letter to Gover10 6
nor Kean referred to the Senate's changes as "a hatchet job.'
He objected to the $2,500 cap placed on awards, stating that it
was added to the bill "[a]t the importuning of the Bar Association."' 1 7 Assemblywoman Ogden withdrew her request for a
conditional veto, however, when informed that the Senate lead10 8
ership would refuse to post any amended bill for a vote.
The memorandum prepared for the Governor by his Counsel recommended conditional veto and return of the bill to the
Senate with proposed amendments that would delete the cap on
awards and also permit awards for reasonable litigation costs.' 0 9
The memorandum also endorsed the use of the term "frivolous"
to describe sanctionable claims, rather than the phrase urged by
Assemblyman Kern, "not substantially justified." The memorandum stated that the term "frivolous" was preferable because it
would more appropriately apply both to plaintiffs and defendants, and because it imposed a "more difficult" standard that
A.1086, 202nd Leg., 1st Sess. (1986).
S.937, 202nd Leg., 1st Sess. (1986).
106 Letter from Assemblyman Walter M.D. Kern, Jr., to Governor Thomas H.
Kean (December 29, 1986).
107 Assemblyman Kern also objected to the substitution of the term "frivolous"
for the phrase "not substantially justified" in the Assembly version.
108 Memorandum from Michael R. Cole, Chief Counsel, et al., to Governor
Thomas H. Kean (February 2, 1987) [hereinafter Cole Memorandum re: A.1086].
109 Id.
104
105
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would be less likely to "chill potential plaintiffs from pursuing
actions."'

'0

Moreover, the memorandum addressed questions regarding
the scope of the statute's definition of claims that would merit an
award. The concern was raised whether the proposed statute
would encompass "an action based on false allegations of
fact.""' In particular, the memorandum questioned whether "a
fraudulent claim which is based upon falsely sworn affidavits may
not come within the bill's definition of frivolous." ' 1 2 The memorandum focused on the statutory standard of frivolousness generally; it contained no discussion of whether a claim based upon a
falsely sworn affidavit might come under subsection (b)(1) as a
claim asserted "in bad faith, solely
for the purpose of harass'' 13
injury.
malicious
or
delay
ment,
Governor Kean conditionally vetoed A. 1086 in accordance
with his Counsel's recommendations and returned it to the legislature with a veto message. The Governor's objections to the bill
as enacted were highly supportive of the policy behind the sanctioning of frivolous claims. The Governor stated that "[t]he prevailing party in [a] harassing action should be able to be made
whole for the expenses incurred in participating in the law
suit,"" 4 and recommended amendment of the proposed statute,
so that subsection (b)(2) would define as "frivolous" a claim that
was "without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not
be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law, or was based on false allegations or fact."' '
No recommendation was made, however, to
110 Cole Memorandum re A. 1086, supra note 108, at 3. The Office of Governor's
Counsel requested comments on the bill from The American Civil Liberties Union
of NewJersey. The A.C.L.U.'s response stressed this possible chillng effect, stating
that plaintiffs in civil rights and civil liberties cases often were "forced to present
controversial and often novel claims."
I The memorandum expressed the concern "that a fraudulent claim which is
based upon falsely sworn affidavits may not come within the bill's definition of frivolous. This could occur if there was a reasonable basis in law to pursue the action
had the facts been true. Thus, such an action might not be considered frivolous
under this bill." Cole Memorandum re A.1086, supra note 108, at 3.
112 Id. The phrase "a complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim or defense ..
commenced in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury" could easily be construed as encompassing a claim based upon knowingly
false allegations.
113 Governor's Statement to A. 1086, A.2029, A.783 and A. 1260, 202nd Leg., 2d
Sess. (1987), at 2.
114 Id.
115 Id.
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modify subsection (b)(1)." 6 The bill was amended accordingly
and passed almost unanimously in the Assembly," 7 but, as expected, it died in the Senate.
The 1988-89 legislative session saw a final, successful effort
to pass a frivolous claims bill. Both Assemblywoman Ogden and
Senator Feldman introduced similar frivolous claims bills based
upon the bill conditionally vetoed by Governor Kean. A. 1316, as
originally introduced by Assemblywoman Ogden, did not allow
for recovery of litigation costs and retained the $2,500 cap on
awards of attorney fees. It did incorporate the assertion of claims
"based on false allegations of fact" into subsection (b)(2), however, as recommended in the Governor's conditional veto
message.l" 8 The Feldman bill was identical but for the absence
of a specific reference to claims based on "false allegations of
fact" as sanctionable." 9
The Assembly Judiciary Committee immediately acted on
the Ogden bill by amending it to add recovery for "reasonable
litigation costs," deleting the cap on attorney fees, and substituting the bill for another pending frivolous claims bill. 120 The Senate Judiciary Committee approved the bill and reported to the
full Senate, which passed it unanimously following a floor
amendment, moved by Senator Feldman, 12 1 which deleted the
1 22
reference to "false allegations of fact" in subsection (b)(2).
The amended bill passed the Assembly and the Governor signed
it despite the deletion of the language that would have permitted
an award "where a legal position is based on false allegations of
fact."' 12 3 Governor Kean signed the bill onJune 28, 1988 and it
116 Id.
117 Official Copy Reprint, Assembly Committee Substitute For A.1086, A.2029,
A.783 and A.1260, 202nd Leg., 2d Sess. (1987).
118 A.1316, 203rd Leg., 1st Sess. (1988).

119 S.1190, 203rd Leg., 1st Sess. (1988).
120 See A.751, 203rd Leg., 1st Sess. (1988).
121 NewJersey Legislative News, March 3, 1988.
122 Senate amendments proposed by Senator Feldman to Assembly Committee
Substitute for A.1316, A.751, 203rd Leg., 1st Sess. (1988).
123 Memorandum Re: A. 1316/A.751 etc., from Michael R. Cole, Chief Counsel,
et al., to Governor Thomas H. Kean (June 10, 1988) [hereinafter "Cole Memorandum re: A. 1316/A.751"]. The memorandum prepared by the Governor's counsel
recommended that the bill be signed even though its provisions "do not reach false
allegations of fact" because two other changes had been made: the deletion of the
cap on awards and the addition of reasonable litigation costs. It was believed to be
unlikely that the bill would be successfully amended again if it was returned to the
legislature. The memorandum also pointed out that false claim actions are covered
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The statute that emerged after a six-year legislative journey
was narrower in scope than the Wisconsin statute that it resembles and the federal rule to which it has been compared. 2 5 The
by New Jersey Court Rule 1:4-8 but did not address the limitations of the rule as a
remedy for an affected litigant. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
The bill went to the Governor's desk supported by the Federation of Advocates of Insurance Reform (FAIR), the insurance industry and Lawyers Encouraging Government and Law (LEGAL). The New Jersey Chapter of the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA), which had supported the previous version of the
bill, the New Jersey State Bar Association, and the New Jersey Chapter of the
A.C.L.U., took no position on the bill. The memorandum prepared by the Office of
Governor's Counsel suggested that the Bar Association and the A.C.L.U. declined
to advance a position on the bill because of "the difficulty of opposing a bill to curb
and penalize frivolous law suits." Cole Memorandum re: A. 1316/A.751, supra, at 4.
124 A.1316, A.751, 203 Leg., 1st Sess. (1988) [hereinafter Sponsor's Statement].
The Sponsor's Statement that accompanied the bill upon passage stated the legislative purpose of the statute as follows:
The purpose of this bill is to allow a party who prevails in a civil suit to
recover reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs from the nonprevailing person if the judge finds that the legal position of the nonprevailing person was not justified and was commenced in bad faith
solely for the purpose of delay or malicious injury, or that the nonprevailing party knew or should have known that the action was without any reasonable basis in law or equity.
Id.
125 For purposes of comparison, relevant subsections of the NewJersey and Wisconsin frivolous claims statutes are set forth below. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:1559.1 (West Supp. 1991); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 814.025 (West Supp. 1991). The capitalized type indicates language in the respective statutes that is either identical or
virtually identical.
The first subsection of the New Jersey statute states that:
a. A party who prevails in a civil action, either as plaintiff or defendant, against any other party may be awarded all reasonable litigation
COSTS and REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES, if the judge finds AT ANY TIME
DURING THE PROCEEDINGS OR UPON JUDGMENT that a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense of the nonprevailing person was
frivolous.
The corresponding subsection of the Wisconsin statute provides that:
(1) If an action or special proceeding commenced or continued by a
plaintiff or a counterclaim, defense or cross complaint commenced,
used or continued by a defendant is found, AT ANY TIME DURING THE
PROCEEDINGS OR UPON JUDGMENT, to be frivolous by the court, the
court shall award to the successful party COSTS determined under s.
814.04 and REASONABLE ATrORNEY FEES.
The New Jersey statute then provides that:
b. IN ORDER TO FIND that a complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or
defense of the nonprevailing party was FRIVOLOUS, the judge shall
find on the basis of the pleadings, discovery, or the evidence
presented that either:
(1) The complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense WAS COMMENCED,

USED OR CONTINUED

PURPOSE OF HARASSMENT,

delay

IN

BAD FAITH,

SOLELY FOR THE

OR MALICIOUS INJURY;

or
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statute's definition of a frivolous claim is almost identical to the
Wisconsin statute, yet its legislative history clearly evidences that
the New Jersey statute is not intended to cover precisely the same
kinds of claims. In particular, the Wisconsin statute's subsection
(3)(b) and the New Jersey statute's subsection (b)(2) contain
identical language permitting an award of fees and costs if a
claim is one that a party "knew or should have known . . . was
without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be
supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." This language in the Wisconsin
statute has been held to include claims based upon false allegations of fact.' 2 6 In contrast, the legislative history of subsection
(b)(2) shows that language that would have included "false allegations of fact" was added, then promptly deleted, by a Senate
amendment. Thus, the phrase "without any reasonable basis in
law or equity" in the New Jersey statute is intended to cover legally baseless claims only.
The scope of subsection (b)(1) of the New Jersey statute,
however, is less clear. The corresponding subsection (3)(a) of
the Wisconsin statute appears to cover both legally and factually
baseless claims asserted in bad faith. But because the judicial decisions interpreting the Wisconsin statute appear to effectively
"nest" subsection (3)(a) of the Wisconsin statute as a category
totally encompassed within subsection (3)(b), 12 7 this interpretation of its scope is speculative. The language of subsection (b)(1)
(2) The nonprevailing party KNEW, OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN, that
the complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or defense WAS WITHOUT ANY REASONABLE BASIS IN LAW OR EQUITY AND COULD NOT BE
SUPPORTED BY

A GOOD

FAITH ARGUMENT

FOR AN

EXTENSION,

MODIFICATION OR REVERSAL OF EXISTING LAW.

Correspondingly, the Wisconsin statute states that:
(3) IN ORDER TO FIND an action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or cross complaint to be FRIVOLOUS under sub. (1), the court
must find one or more of the following:
(a) The action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or
cross complaint WAS COMMENCED, USED OR CONTINUED IN BAD
FAITH, SOLELY FOR PURPOSES OF HARASSING OR MALICIOUSLY INJURING ANOTHER.

(b) The party or the party's attorney KNEW, OR SHOULD HAVE
KNOWN, that the action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or cross complaint WAS WITHOUT ANY REASONABLE BASIS
IN LAW OR EQUITY AND COULD NOT BE SUPPORTED BY A GOOD
FAITH ARGUMENT FOR AN EXTENSION, MODIFICATION OR REVERSAL OF EXISTING LAW.

126
127

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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of the New Jersey statute, standing alone, could be held to cover
claims based on knowingly false allegations of fact or law, i.e., a
claim asserted "in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury." So construed, subsections
(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the NewJersey statute would define two overlapping categories of claims rather than the "nested" categories
apparently established under the Wisconsin statute. In other
words, subsection (b)(1) would cover legally or factually baseless
claims that were known by the claimant to be baseless, whereas
subsection (b)(2) would cover only legally baseless claims that a
claimant "knew or should have known" were baseless.
The New Jersey law's legislative history sheds some doubt
on this construction of the scope of the two subsections, however, and suggests that neither subsection covers factually baseless claims, whether negligently or knowingly advanced. The
memorandum prepared by the Office of Governor's Counsel
upon the passage of A.1086 suggests that the standard of frivolousness might not encompass false allegations of fact. In contrast, the memorandum prepared upon the passage of A.1316,
which was signed into law, unequivocally states that the enactment "does not contain language allowing the award of counsel
fees where
a legal position is based on false allegations of
fact.' 28 If it is true that neither subsection covers factually baseless claims, then the two subsections of the New Jersey statute
define "nested" categories of legal frivolousness: subsection
(b)(1) covering claims without legal basis asserted "in bad faith"
and "solely" to harass, delay or maliciously injure, and subsection (b)(2) covering claims without legal basis which are asserted
by a party who "knew or should have known" that the claim was
legally baseless. Such a construction, however, would effectively
negate the first subsection of the statute. The preferred view is
to construe the first section of the statute as encompassing both
factually and legally baseless claims that are advanced with actual
knowledge of their baselessness and with an improper purpose,
leaving the second subsection of the statute to apply a negligence
standard only to the assertion of legally baseless claims. While
this construction differs from the interpretation given the similar
provisions of the Wisconsin statute, the difference is justified by
the dissimilar legislative history of the two enactments.
Another point of difference between the two statutes is that
128 Cole Memorandum re: A.1086, supra note 108, at 3 and Cole Memorandum
re: A.1316/A.751, supra note 123.
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unlike the mandatory language used in the Wisconsin statute, the
New Jersey statute provides that the court "may award" attorney
fees and costs. The New Jersey statute also authorizes the award
of fees against parties, but does not contain any reference to
awards against attorneys. In a statement made two years after
the bill was signed into law, Assemblywoman Ogden maintained
that the question of attorney liability under the statute " 'really
didn't come up' " as the bill passed through the legislature,
although she assumed that the judge making an award under the
statute would decide whether the attorney or the client would be
liable for an award. 1 2 9 The statements accompanying the bill in
its passage through the legislature, however, including the Sponsor's Statement to the enacted bill, repeatedly declared that an
award of attorney fees and costs may be made against a "nonprevailing person" or a "nonprevailing party."' 3 0
III.

THE APPLICATION OF THE NEW JERSEY FRIVOLOUS
CLAIMS STATUTE

Given the extensive legislative history of the frivolous claims
statute and the issues it raises concerning the statute's applicability, one might think that discussion of that history would figure
prominently in judicial opinions. In fact, only a few of the reported decisions refer to the legislative history, and the discussion in a number of the opinions focuses instead on comparisons
between the statute and Federal Rule 11. The first reported decision involving the statute proceeded from the assumption that
the law should be read in light of Rule 11. In Evans v. The Prudential Property and Casualty Co.,"1' the frivolous claims statute was
raised by an insurance company as a counterclaim to an action by
its insured.13 2 The insured argued that the frivolous claims stat129 Kathleen Bird,Judge Hits Firm with Frivolous-Suit Sanction, 126 N.J.L.J. 111, 114
(July 19, 1990) [hereinafter Bird, Frivolous-Suit Sanction]. The value of this postenactment statement in construing the statute is questionable. See Dumont
Lowden, Inc. v. Hansen, 38 N.J. 49, 56, 183 A.2d 16, 20 (1962) (local officials'
affidavits as to their intent in adopting a zoning ordinance not admissible on disputed issue concerning construction of ordinance).
130 See Sponsor's Statement, supra note 124; see also Assembly Judiciary Committee Statement to Assembly Committee Substitute for A.1316/A.751, 203rd Leg.,
1st Sess. (1988) ("The committee substitute permits a party who prevails in a civil
suit to recover reasonable attorney fees and all reasonable litigation costs from the
nonprevailing person, if the judge finds that the legal position of the nonprevailing
person was frivolous); SenateJudiciary Committee Statement to Assembly Committee Substitute for A.1316 (1988) (same).
131 233 N.J. Super. 652, 559 A.2d 888 (Law Div. 1989).
132 The insured had submitted a claim to binding arbitration, accepted the arbi-
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ute, like an action for malicious prosecution, could not be asserted as a counterclaim to an action alleged to be frivolous. The
Evans court rejected the comparison between the statute and an
action for malicious prosecution,133 basing its conclusion that the
statute could not be raised as a counterclaim on the statute's language and by analogy to Rule 1 1.134 The court stated that a
claim under the statute should be raised like one under Rule 11
by motion "immediately following the establishment of the
movant as a prevailing party," which might occur at any stage of
the litigation.' 35 The Evans court also noted that an award under
the statute is permissive, not mandatory, and that the statute
does not permit an award of punitive damages. The court also
suggested that an award against a party's attorney rather than
against the party might more effectively carry out the statute's
underlying policy of reducing unmeritorious litigation. 3 6 The
court declined to reach the issue of the statute's constitutionality,
tration award, then sued the insurance company for the amount of the loss in excess of the award. The complaint of the insured raised eight separate causes of
action including claims of bad faith, violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, intentional infliction of emotional harm, and violation of the policy of the state Unfair
Claims Settlement Practice Act. Evans, 233 N.J. Super. at 654-55, 559 A.2d at 889.
133 Id. at 660, 559 A.2d at 892. In particular, the court found that the elements
which must be shown in the respective actions are significantly different: A malicious use of process action requires the institution of the original claim "without
reasonable or probable cause," a term of art which connotes "a want of factual
basis." It also requires that the claim be "motivated by malice." In contrast, the
court said, the statute requires only one of two elements be present: the assertion
of a claim "without reasonable legal or equitable basis, as opposed to a reasonable
factual basis," or a claim made "in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harassment,
delay or malicious injury." Injuxtaposing these elements, the court appeared to be
demonstrating that the want of a factual basis for a proceeding is not included
within the scope of the frivolous claims statute. The court did so, however, without
discussing the legislative history of the statute, which supports this position explicitly. See discussion infra at notes 114-122.
134 Evans, 233 N.J. Super. at 664, 559 A.2d at 894. The court also determined
that no award of costs was appropriate under the statute for the assertion of the
defendant's statutory claim as a counterclaim, because the counterclaim was not
raised in order to harass, delay or maliciously injure. Moreover, the Evans court
observed, given the recent enactment of the statute, there were no judicial opinions
to guide the defendant in determining whether a claim under the statute was properly pleaded as a counterclaim. Id. at 665, 559 A.2d at 895.
135 Id. at 664, 559 A.2d at 894. The court noted that assessing the frivolousness
of a party's position before the ultimate conclusion of litigation might serve the
goals of the statute by inducing a "litigant to rethink his or her entire position and,
based on the analysis and the process of going through it, to participate in settlement discussions" that might result in the termination of the litigation. Id. at 659,
559 A.2d at 892.
136 Id. at 665 n. 3, 559 A.2d at 894-95 n.3.
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however, as the parties had not raised the issue.'
The relationship between the frivolous claims statute and
the New Jersey court rule authorizing awards of attorney fees was
addressed by the New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division,
in Somerset Trust Co. v. Sternberg,' 3 8 one of the few opinions to refer
to the statute's legislative history. Somerset Trust involved a mortgage foreclosure action in which the defendant mortgagors filed
an answer to the complaint in foreclosure, an answer that was
ultimately stricken as legally insufficient. 39 The filing of the answer had the effect of delaying the entry of a final foreclosure
judgment for approximately six months. 4 ° The plaintiff mortgagee then filed a motion requesting an award of attorney fees and
costs pursuant to the frivolous claims statute. 4 ' The defendant
mortgagors had admitted that their defense was "frivolous,"' 42
but argued that the previously entered foreclosure judgment included an award of attorney fees and costs as authorized and limited in amount by New Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9(a)(4). The rule
provides a specific formula for the calculation of attorney fee
awards in mortgage foreclosure actions, specifically stating that
"[iln no case shall the fee allowance exceed the limitations of this
rule." The Somerset Trust court harmonized the rule and the statute by emphasizing that the former court rule had been held to
serve the purpose of encouraging the making of mortgage loans
in New Jersey by permitting mortgagees to recover the costs of
Id. at 658 n.1, 559 A.2d at 891 n.l.
238 N.J. Super. 279, 569 A.2d 849 (Ch. Div. 1989).
139 Id. at 280-81, 569 A.2d at 850.
140 Id. at 281, 569 A.2d at 850.
141 Id.
142 This concession permitted the court to sidestep the issue of whether the filing
of the answer violated subsection (b)(1), as a defense interposed "solely for the
purpose of... delay," or subsection (b)(2) as a claim without reasonable basis in law
or equity, or both. This case is an example of the phenomenon noted in the discussion of the Wisconsin frivolous claims statute. The court found in this case that the
defendant's answer "contained no legal or equitable defenses." Id. at 281, 569 A.2d
at 850; see N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 15-59. lb(2) (a defense is frivolous if it is "without any
reasonable basis in law or equity"). The court also found that a defense interposed
solely for the purpose of delaying foreclosure proceedings is the type of pleading
which the legislature sought to address by the enactment of the statute. Id. at 285,
569 A.2d at 852-53; see N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-59.1b(l) (a defense is frivolous if it is
asserted "in bad faith, solely for the purpose of ...delay"). As a practical matter, a
finding that a claim is "without any reasonable basis in law or equity" is a virtual
predicate to a finding that it is being asserted "in bad faith, solely for the purpose
of harassment, delay or malicious injury." See Sjogren, Inc. v. Caterina Insurance
Co., 244 N.J. Super. 369, 582 A.2d 841 (Ch. Div. 1990), discussed infra at notes
'37
138

146-150 and accompanying text; see also First Federated Bank v. McDonah, 143 Wis.

2d 429, 422 N.W.2d 113 (Ct.App. 1988), discussed supra at note 65.
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foreclosure and of "making the mortgagee whole."'' 43 In contrast, the court found the purpose of the frivolous claims statute,
as evidenced by the Sponsor's Statement to the enacted bill, to
be "punitive" and "designed to discourage the filing of nonmeri44
torious answers."

The Somerset Trust court held that the court rule's compensatory purpose had already been served by the inclusion of some of
the plaintiff's costs and fees in the foreclosure judgment. The
court stated further that allowance of the additional costs and attorneys fees expended in disposing of the defendants' nonmeritorious defense would serve the frivolous claims statute's
punitive purpose without conflicting with the rule's policy. 145
Although the defense raised in Somerset Trust appears to have
been frivolous under either subsection of the statute, the court
failed to make any finding as to the knowledge of the defendant
mortgagors themselves, as opposed to their attorney, concerning
the merits of their defense. In failing to make such a finding, the
court made a crucial conceptual leap - the presumed knowledge
of the defendants' attorney concerning the lack of merit of the
defense, as demonstrated by the reported cases cited by the
court, was attributed to the defendants. The court allowed an
award against the defendants without any finding as to their actual knowledge even though subsection (b)(1) of the statute requires a finding of "bad faith" and purposefulness, and
subsection (b)(2) requires a finding that "the nonprevailing party
knew or should have known" that a claim was frivolous. This unstated and undiscussed imputation of the attorney's knowledge
to the attorney's clients is applied in subsequent cases as well.
Several courts, apparently unaware of the legislative history
of the statute as it concerns claims based upon false allegations of
fact, have applied the statute to factually baseless claims. Sjogren,
Inc. v. Caterina Insurance Agency,' 46 involved an action instituted
with the filing of a verified complaint alleging fraudulent concealment of an outstanding lease interest on property sold to a corporation. Counsel for the defendant immediately produced
143 Somerset Trust, 238 N.J. Super. at 286, 569 A.2d at 853 (citing Collective Fed.
Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Toland, 207 N.J. Super. 157, 504 A.2d 59 (Ch. Div. 1985)).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 287, 569 A.2d at 853. The Somerset Trust court noted the potential constitutional issue that the statute raised with respect to the supreme court's rulemaking power, and declined, as had the Evans court, to address the issue because it had
not been raised by the parties.
146 244 N.J. Super. 369, 582 A.2d 841 (Ch. Div. 1990).
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evidence to refute the allegation of concealment of the lease interest, but discovery continued until the deposition of the plaintiff corporation's president conclusively established his prior
knowledge of the lease interest. The defendant refused to sign a
stipulation of dismissal with prejudice proffered by the plaintiff's
attorney, countering instead with a motion pursuant to the frivolous claims statute.
The Sjogren court found that the defendant was a "prevailing
party" under the statute despite plaintiff's attempt to dismiss the
action. The court held that the plaintiff had violated subsection
(b)(1) of the statute by filing the complaint in bad faith "in an
improper attempt to obtain possession of the property" from the
tenant after the tenant exercised his right to renew his lease, and
subsection (b) (2) by filing the complaint knowing that it was without a reasonable basis in law or equity.1 47 The court's finding
that the conduct of the plaintiff corporation transgressed subsection (b) (1) of the statute is justified under a literal reading of the
statutory language. The court had before it a verified complaint
signed by the corporate plaintiff's secretary, specifically alleging
a lack of knowledge of the pre-existing lease agreement, as well
as documentary evidence that this allegation was untrue. A deliberate falsehood with respect to the central allegation of the
plaintiff's cause of action certainly falls within subsection (b)(1)
as a claim asserted "in bad faith, solely for the purpose of harrassment, delay or malicious injury."
A factually baseless complaint is not encompassed in subsection (b)(2), however, given the legislative history. 4 ' In discussing the appropriateness of an award, the Sjogren court relied
heavily on case law decided under Rule 11. In doing so, the
court imputed to the plaintiff's attorney a duty of reasonable inquiry into the underlying facts prior to the filing of a complaint
and a continuing obligation to cease prosecution of a matter if it
became apparent that the client's claim was not grounded in fact
or law.' 4 9 Despite the imputation of a statutory violation to the
plaintiff's attorney as well as to the plaintiff corporation, the
court appears to have ordered only the plaintiff corporation to
Id. at 376-77, 582 A.2d at 845-46.
See discussion of the statute's legislative history, supra notes 99-130 and accompanying text.
149 Sjogren, 244 N.J. Super. at 373-75, 582 A.2d at 843-45. The Court stated that
the frivolous claims statute "is patterned after" federal Rule 11. Id. at 373, 582
A.2d at 843.
147
148
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pay the award under the statute. 50
Chernin v. Mardan Corp., 15 1 decided shortly after Sjogren, also
involved a claim found to have been unsupported by fact. Appearing pro se, the plaintiff attorney brought an action to foreclose a tax-sale certificate.' 5 2 The plaintiff named a multiplicity
of defendants to foreclose their respective interests in the underlying property, including the Lend Lease Corporation. The
plaintiff believed that the corporation had a relevant interest
based upon a recorded deed that showed it owning a parcel of
land included within the metes and bounds description of the
foreclosed upon property. 153 Upon being advised by counsel for
the corporation that the title company report upon which he relied was erroneous, the plaintiff moved to amend his complaint
to delete reference to the corporation as a defendant.' 54 The
corporation responded with a motion for counsel fees and costs
pursuant to the frivolous claims statute on the ground that the
corporation was a "prevailing party," and that the action was frivolous. First, the defendant claimed, the plaintiff "knew or should
have known" that the complaint against it "was without any reasonable basis in law or equity." Second, the defendant stressed
that the plaintiff delayed for two months before filing the motion
55
to withdraw the complaint.
The Chernin court declined to impose sanctions on the plaintiff. The plaintiff, the court explained, has a duty as an attorney
under the Rules of Professional Conduct to "promptly and efficiently address litigation matters under his control," and the two
month delay, although arguably negligent, did not constitute bad
15 6
faith within the meaning of subsection (b)(1) of the statute.
The court also found that subsection (b)(2), permitting an award
for the filing of a claim that a party "knew or should have known"
was baseless, imposed upon litigants an objective standard of
"reasonable investigation" before commencing litigation. The
Chernin court found, however, that the plaintiff had satisfied the
reasonable inquiry standard, even though he relied upon incorrect information in naming the corporation as a defendant.
Thus, the court asserted that to sanction the plaintiff under such
15o See id. at 370-78, 582 A.2d at 842-46.
151 244 N.J. Super. 379, 582 A.2d 847 (Ch. Div. 1990).
152

Id. at 380, 582 A.2d at 847.

153 Id. at 381, 582 A.2d at 847-48.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 383-84, 582 A.2d at 849.
156

Id.
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circumstances "would extend application of the frivolous claims
statute beyond its spirit and intent." ' 57

While appearing to have reached the right result on the facts
presented, the Chernin court incorrectly analyzed the standard of

frivolousness under subsection (b)(2). As stated above, subsection (b)(2) is intended to cover legally baseless claims. In addition, however salutary the imposition of an affirmative duty to

investigate the facts underlying a claim might be, there is no support in the statute's language or its legislative history for imposing that duty: The "knew or should have known" language of
subsection (b)(2) applies only to a claim's legal basis, not its factual basis. The Chernin court also found that the statute imposes
an obligation on "representatives of litigants" to determine

"whether the revealed facts constitute a reasonable claim in law

or equity," even though the statute contains no language refer-

ring to "representatives of litigants."
In December 1990, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, first construed the frivolous claims statute in Iannone v. McHale.'5 8 The trial court had summarily made an award

of counsel fees against plaintiffs who had alleged that the names
of voters favorably disposed toward their ticket had been removed from the voter rolls by the county election board at the
behest of certain of the defendants.1 59 Even though the action
was settled with a stipulation that the county election board ad-

here to the electoral laws' procedural requirements, the trial
court blasted the plaintiffs, characterizing the settlement as "little

more than a face-saving device '"'6 and accusing the plaintiffs of a
"mindless shotgun approach" to litigation.' 6 '
157 Id. at 385, 582 A.2d at 850.
158

245 N.J. Super. 17, 583 A.2d 770 (App. Div. 1990).

159 236 N.J. Super. 227, 565 A.2d 422 (Law Div. 1989), rev'd, 245 N.J. Super. 17,

583 A.2d 770 (App. Div. 1990).
160 lannone, 236 N.J. Super. at 230-31, 565 A.2d at 424. The trial court opinion
does not do complete justice to the underlying facts, but the appellate court opinion points out that the plaintiffs instituted suit after learning that the county board
of elections, in violation of the state election laws, had removed the voter registration pages of 177 voters only five days before the election, without providing the
required notice to the voters and the Attorney General. lannone v. McHale, 245
N.J. Super. 17, 21, 583 A.2d 770, 772 (App. Div. 1990). The trial court criticized
the plaintiffs' attorney for "advis[ing] the the court that the primary purpose of his
suit had been realized; namely, calling the county election board's attention to their
'illegal' practices and getting the board to agree henceforth to abide by the provisions of [the election law]." 236 N.J. Super. at 230, 565 A.2d at 424.
161 Id. at 231, 565 A.2d at 424. In full, the court declared that:
The pervasive attitude today is to sue anyone and everyone for anything and everything. Once suit is commenced the next stop in this
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The appellate division reversed the trial court decision in all
respects. The appellate court accepted the characterization of
the frivolous claims statute as derivative of amended Federal
Rule 11, stating that the legislature's "evident intent" was "to
superimpose upon state court practice not only the intended effect but also the implementing technique of Rule 1 1.' 162 The
Iannone court also endorsed the use of federal cases construing
63
Rule 11 as precedential in interpreting the statute.
The Iannone opinion acknowledged the rule's policy of deterrence, contrasting that policy with the concern that applications
for counsel fees and costs would engender additional, " 'satellite
litigation, and would chill vigorous advocacy.' 164 The court further examined both the policy behind New Jersey Court Rule
4:42-9, which limits awards of counsel fees, as well as the New
Jersey Supreme Court's consistent refusal to adopt the "English
Rule" of routine awards of counsel fees to prevailing litigants.
The court noted that the "American Rule," requiring parties to
bear their own counsel fees, "promotes the goal of equal access
to the court irrespective of economic status" and "protects
against actual or apparent abuse and corruption."' 65 Accordingly, the Iannone court announced a set of limiting principles applicable to claims brought under the statute to balance the
competing policies involved:
We thus construe [the statute] in view of the concern that
while baseless litigation must be deterred, nevertheless the
counsel-fee sanction mode of deterrence should not be permitted to generate even more litigation, the right of access to
the courts should not be unduly infringed upon, honest and
creative advocacy should not be discouraged, and the salutary
policy of litigants bearing, in the main, their own litigation
thoughtless process is to commence endless discovery in an effort to
get something on someone. This results in clogged courts, enormous
costs, untold anguish and emotional upset for those caught in the
legal fishnet cast out with nothing more in mind than ensnaring as
many litigants as possible. The public, through federal and state fiat,
has decreed that this mindless shotgun approach to seeking redress
for every conceivable perceived wrong shall stop.
Id.

162 lannone, 245 N.J. Super. at 26, 583 A.2d at 774-75. Writing for the appellate
court, Judge Pressler acknowledged that the state supreme court had not amended
the New Jersey court rule analog in conformity with the 1983 federal rule
amendments.
163 Id. at 26, 583 A.2d at 775.
164 Id. (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 110 S. Ct 2447
(1990)).
165 Id. at 27, 583 A.2d at 775.
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costs, should not be abandoned. Hence the counsel-fee sanction must 66not be made available for every litigation
infraction. 1

To this point, the court's reference to Rule 11 is not inconsistent with the purpose and provisions of the New Jersey statute; general considerations of due process and public policy support such
caution in imposing sanctions on litigants. Moreover, the statute
expressly excepts claims "supported by a good faith argument for
extension, modification or reversal of existing law." In discussing
this definition of frivolous conduct, however, reference to Rule 11
confuses the court's analysis. The appellate court relied first on
Rule 11 jurisprudence in concluding that the courts should use an
objective standard for assessing the validity of a nonprevailing
party's claim, referring only secondarily to the New Jersey statute's
language.167
The court based its conclusion that both of the statute's subsections require an objective evaluation of frivolousness in part on the
assertion that "as a practical matter [an objective] test, rather than a
subjective test, is far better calculated to reduce the length and complexity of the required hearing in support of a counsel fee motion
made under the statute."' 16 8 The court flatly stated that the statute
mandates an objective evaluation of frivolousness because section
(b) "expressly requires the finding of frivolousness to be based on
the record already made in the matter, thus precluding routine collateral evidential -forays into states of mind and non-record facts and
circumstances."1

69

Id. at 28, 583 A.2d at 775-76.
In addressing this point, the lannone court seemed to misinterpret the provisions of both the Rule 11 and the New Jersey statute. The opinion states that the
federal rule requires a "conjunctive two-prong test for sanctionable baselessness:
improper motive and a litigation position unfounded in fact and law," as opposed
to the "disjunctive, two-prong test of the New Jersey statute." Id. at 28, 29, 583
A.2d at 776. This comparison is misleading if it is intended to show an essential
difference between the two provisions. Both the federal rule and the New Jersey
statute permit an award if only one of the two standards they set is violated. See
Schwarzer, supra note 78, at 186. The apparent conjunctive/disjunctive difference
stems merely from the grammatical manner in which the standards are set forth.
The federal rule states the second part of its test in the negative: The signer of a
pleading must certify that it is not imposed for any improper purpose. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 11, supra note 74 and accompanying text. The comparable "prong" of the
New Jersey statute states a similar standard but states it positively: A party's litigation position is frivolous if it "was commenced, used or continued in bad faith .. "
See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 15-59.1. The substance of the "prongs" of the respective
enactments distinguishes them.
168 245 N.J. Super. at 29, 583 A.2d at 776.
169 Id. at 29, 583 A.2d at 776.
166
167

192

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:153

The statute does not completely support the Iannone court's
conclusion on the standard to be used in assessing frivolousness.
The definition of frivolousness contains both objective and subjective elements. The first part of subsection (b)(2) imposes an objective standard, providing that a claim is frivolous if "[t]he prevailing
party knew or should have known" that the claim was without reasonable basis in law or equity. The second part states a subjective
qualification - a claim must not only be without reasonable basis in
law or equity, but also one that a party "knew or should have known
...could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." Third, subsection
(b) (1) sets forth a completely subjective standard of frivolousness; it
states that a claim is frivolous if it was asserted "in bad faith, solely
for the purpose of harassment, delay or malicious injury." Given
the "bad faith" and "purpose" language of this subsection, a subjective evaluation of frivolousness is appropriate. Serious due process
questions would be raised if a party against whom an award was
sought under this subsection were not given the opportunity to rebut a charge that a claim was brought for a consciously wrongful
70
purpose.'
Whether the statute was intended to preclude the conduct of
hearings on the issue of frivolousness is also questionable. The statute provides that a finding of frivolousness shall be based upon the
"pleadings, discovery or evidence presented." In context, this language does not appear to constitute a limitation on the record already made in the action, nor necessarily to preclude the
presentation of evidence going to the issue of frivolousness once the
statute is raised.
Despite this statutory misinterpretation, the Iannone court
reached what is probably the right result under a correct reading of
the statute's provisions. The court held that the imposition of an
attorney fee award was not warranted "either because of improper
motives or lack of well-foundedness." The appellate division underscored that because a petition to set aside an election must be filed
within 30 days, the plaintiffs were afforded little time to investigate
their claim.' 7 1 Moreover, the court maintained, there were in fact
election irregularities that were known to have occurred, the knowledge of which justified the institution of the action without further
investigation.
170 The Wisconsin courts have so held. See supra note 70 (discussing cases on
point).
171 Iannone, 245 N.J. Super. at 29-30, 583 A.2d at 776.
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The court posited what appears to be virtually a per se principle
insulating the plaintiffs in election contests from the operation of
the frivolous claims statute on the ground that "[t]his is important
litigation going to the heart of the democratic process upon which
all our institutions depend."' 72 The appellate division had little to
say concerning the issue of constitutionality, other than refusing to
consider the issue because the award of fees and costs was being
reversed on other grounds. 173 The Iannone opinion did, however,
raise a number of unresolved questions that implicate the constitutional issues involved, in particular the assessment of fees against a
litigant for conduct attributable to the attorney. The court also
seemed to suggest that an attorney might be liable for an award
74
under the statute. 1
The appellate division's opinion in Semexant v. MIL Limited 171 is
consistent with the constrained approach of lannone v. McHale. The
defendant manufacturer in a products liability action filed a thirdparty complaint against the plaintiff's employer for indemnification
and contribution, despite the fact that the New Jersey Supreme
Court held in 1986 that a third-party tortfeasor may not seek contribution from an injured worker's employer. 1 76 The employer advised the defendant manufacturer of the existing precedent, then
moved for summary judgment and attorney fees under the statute.
172 Id. at 31-32, 583 A.2d at 778. The appellate division suggested that "the
courts should be more, not less, indulgent in appraising the motives and wellgroundedness of the litigants' legal positions" in election contests. Id.
173 Id. at 24-25, 583 A.2d at 773-74.
174 Judge Pressler raised other interesting dilemmas posed by the statute:
Among the problems we note without deciding them are those suggested by the fact that while the thrust of the federal rule addresses
the attorney's conduct in signing a frivolous pleading, for which, however, the client may also or exclusively be charged, our statute's focus,
perhaps anomalously so, is on the client's conduct. Can a non-prevailing lay client who believes himself to be aggrieved ever know or be
chargeable with knowledge "that the complaint, counterclaim, crossclaim or defense was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and
could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law?" Is the client who relies on
his attorney's legal judgment and advice protected, as in the case of
malicious prosecution and abuse of process claims, provided only that
he accurately discloses the facts to his attorney? By the same token, is
an attorney protected by accepting the client's statement of facts without, as required by the federal rule, conducting a further "reasonable
inquiry" into them?
Id. at 30 n.4, 583 A.2d at 766-77 n.4.
175 252 N.J. Super. 318, 599 A.2d 935 (App. Div. 1991).
176 See Ramos v. Browning Ferris Industries, 103 N.J. 177 (1986) and Stephenson
v. R.A. Jones & Co., Inc., 103 N.J. 194 (1986).
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The trial court held that the third-party complaint was not "frivolous" within the meaning of the statute because the defendant employer had asserted "a theory that is developing.""' The appellate
division agreed, noting particularly that one justice had dissented in
the controlling cases and that other jurisdictions permitted contribution by employers. The court concluded that "merely because [a]
viewpoint occupies minority status at the present time" did not
render the claim frivolous. 178 The court, citing Iannone, found that
sanctioning a party under these circumstances "would stifle 'honest
and creative advocacy.' "
The third appellate opinion construing the statute is the first
reported decision in which a court penalized a litigant for bringing
an action that the court regarded as being legally unfounded. In
McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle and Casino, the appellate division upheld an award of attorney fees against the plaintiff in a case involving the alleged breach of an employment contract. 1 79 The plaintiff
brought an action for damages after she sought to return to her job
following maternity leave, but was told that her position had been
filled. The plaintiff's attorney framed the complaint as one for
breach of the terms and conditions of the defendant's employment
handbook, as well as breach of "actual warranties and representations made by the defendant through its agents, servants and employees." A second count of the complaint claimed detrimental
reliance upon "representations to the plaintiff concerning her employment after her maternity leave."' 8 0 The plaintiff also relied
upon the terms of her application for a leave of absence, extended
several times under identical conditions, which stated that she could
return to her job if it had not been "permanently filled or eliminated
because of business requirements.""'
177 252 N.J. Super. 318, 599 A.2d 935 (App. Div. 1991).
178

Id., 599 A.2d 935 (App. Div. 1991).

179 McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino, A-4057-90TI

(N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div., decided Jan. 17, 1992), certif granted, 127 N.J. 566 (1992).
180 Brief and Appendix for Plaintiff, McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and
Casino, Appendix pages 2a-3a (Plaintiff's Complaint). The oral representations
upon which plaintiff relied were described in her answers to interrogatories, which
stated: "I was told that I was being temporarily replaced until I returned; each time
(2 times), I went to Mr. Rush for his approval to extend my leave of absence, he
never indicated anything to the contrary or that I'd been permanently replaced
(although I believe that my successor, Carolyn Betz was made permanent Reservations Manager very shortly after I went on maternity leave.) Plaintiff's Answer to
Interrogatory No. 6, Brief and Appendix for Plaintiff, McKeown-Brand v. Trump
Castle Hotel and Casino, Appendix page 13a.
181 The plaintiff relied both on an alleged oral assurances and on a statement in
her application for leave of absence which stated: "I understand and will comply
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At her deposition, the plaintiff acknowledged receipt of an employee handbook that contained her signed acknowledgment that
her employment was at will.182 Moreover, the plaintiff's deposition
revealed that her possible damages totaled only $2,000.183 The defendant's attorney suggested that the complaint be voluntarily withdrawn, because the plaintiff's damages were minimal and because
her claim was barred under the supreme court's decision in Wooley
v. Hoffman-LaRoche, which permits employers to disclaim the provisions of employee handbooks as contractually binding.'" 4 The
plaintiff's attorney offered to settle the case for the full amount of
plaintiff's claimed damages of $2,000, but counsel for the defendant
insisted that the complaint was without merit under Woolley and filed
a motion for summary judgment."8 5 The plaintiff's attorney did not
oppose the defendant's motion, which was granted. 18 6 In response
to the defendant's subsequent motion for an award under the frivolous claims statute, the plaintiff's attorney stated that she had not
opposed the motion for summary judgment "because discovery...
revealed that plaintiff's provable damages were minimal."' 8 7 The
plaintiff's attorney also argued that there was no basis for concludwith the following: 1. I will be reeinstated to my same, or similar job provided (a)
My job has not been permanently filled or eliminated because of business requirements, or...." McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino, A-4057-90T1
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., decided Jan. 17, 1992), slip op. at 3, certif granted, 127
N.J. 566 (1992).
182

Id.

The plaintiff acknowledged that when she was ready to return to work and
was told that her position as Reservations Manager had been permanently filled,
she was given the opportunity to investigate other openings in the company. Brief
and Appendix for Plaintiff, McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino,
Appendix pages 43a-47a (Deposition of Nancy McKeown-Brand, pages 26-29).
The available openings consisted of entry level positions and a single supervisory
position in the food and beverage area, in which the plaintiff had no experience. Id.
Plaintiff admitted being aware that another, more suitable position might become
available, but she did not pursue that position. Id. at 47a-49a. Plaintiff's attorney
apparently conceded that her failure to pursue any of these positions limited her
damages to lost wages totalling only $2,000. Id. at 38a-40a (Letter from Mary J.
Maudsley, Esq. to Hon. John G. Himmelberger, Jr., J.S.C., February 6, 1991).
184 See Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 307, 309, modified 101
N.J. 10 (1985). Under Woolley, the provisions of an employee manual are not contractually binding if the manual "prominently and unmistakably" states that it is not
a binding contract. See McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino, A4057-90T1 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div., decided Jan. 17, 1992), slip op. at 5, certif.
granted, 127 N.J. 566 (1992).
185 Id. at 3.
186 Id. at 3-4.
187 Brief and Appendix for Plaintiff, McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and
Casino, Appendix page 38a (Letter from Mary J. Maudsley, Esq. to Hon. John G.
Himmelberger, Jr., J.S.C., February 6, 1991).
183
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ing that the plaintiff had asserted her claims in bad faith or to harrass, delay or maliciously injure, and that she had acted at all times
on advice of counsel and with a good faith belief that she had a valid
claim.' 8 8
The trial court awarded the defendant attorney fees and expenses totalling over $10,000, encompassing not only the preparation of the summary judgment motion, but all of defendant's
expenses commencing from the filing of the complaint.' 8 9 In upholding the trial court award, the appellate court determined that
the plaintiff's claim based upon the defendant's employee handbook was barred under Wooley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., and that
"there was no reasonable basis for doubt about the applicable
rule."' 90 The plaintiff's claim based upon the terms of her leave
application were considered not "substantial"; her claim based
upon an alleged oral representation was rejected on the grounds
that, because the plaintiff's leave was for medical reasons, she could
not allege that she relied upon a representation that her job would
be held open. 9 ' The appellate court did not consider, however, the
plaintiff's claim that the defendant had breached the employer's obligation of good faith and fair-dealing, an obligation recognized by
courts in other jurisdictions.' 9 2 As to the contention that the plain188 Id. at 38a-40a. The assertion that the plaintiff had acted on advice of counsel
was supported by an affidavit of plaintiff's attorney which stated: "I advised the
plaintiff at all times that she had a viable complaint, based on the defendant's representations to her that her position would be temporarily filled during her absence
for maternity leave, and that she could return to it at the end of her maternity
leave ....
The plaintiff at all times acted on my advice, and would not have filed this
complaint had I not advised her that she had a valid cause of action based on the
facts as she understood them." Id. Appendix pages 41a-42a.
189 Id. at 38a.
190 McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino, A-4057-90TI (N. J.
Super. Ct. App. Div., decidedJan. 17, 1992), certif granted, 127 N.J. 566 (1992), slip
op. at 3-7.
191 Id. at 3-5, 7.
192 The plaintiff's attorney stated:
[I have] advised the plaintiff ofJudge Haines' decision indicating that
the Courts of New Jersey had not as yet adopted the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing as being applicable between employer and
employee in the wrongful termination context. However, I told her
that Judge Haines had described that theory as 'attractive' and I further advised her that I believed that at some point, although not necessarily before the end of her litigation, that the law in New Jersey
would be changed to include the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing.
The opinion to which the plaintiff's attorney apparently referred was Crowell v.
Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 206 N.J. Super. 298, 502 A.2d 573 (Law Div. 1984), in
which Martin Haines, J.S.C., considered the judicial opinions from other jurisdic-
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tiff failed to defend against the motion for summary judgment only
because the minimal amount of damages did not warrant the expense, the appellate court stated that the plaintiff's attorney was obligated to "make reasonable efforts to ascertain the pertinent facts
and to evaluate them in light of the applicable law" prior to the
commencement of suit. 19 3 The court relied upon the Rules of Pro-

fessional Conduct in determining that the plaintiff's attorney had a
duty of investigation as to the facts and the law before commencing
94
litigation.'
The McKeown-Brand majority's opinion alluded, in a footnote,
to the problem posed by the attorney's breach of duty being chargeable to the plaintiff, suggesting that the plaintiff might have a right
of action against her attorney for being subjected to the award
under the statute.' 9 5 In a concurring opinion, however, Judge King
pointed out that although the plaintiff had not challenged the constitutionality of the statute, he believed that it raised "substantial
due process questions" concerning the right of a party (not the
party's attorney) to receive "actual notice" of a claim under the statute, "the right to independent representation of the party-litigant,
the right of the party to a substantive hearing before a judgment or
order for payment is entered, questions on separation of powers,
and questions on interference with the judiciary's exclusive [constitutional] prerogatives." 196 The New Jersey Supreme Court granted
tions which recognize this obligation, but ruled that the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing was not yet recognized under New Jersey law.
193 McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino, A-4057-90T1 (N. J.
Super. Ct. App. Div., decidedJan. 17, 1992), slip op. at 8, certif granted, 127 N.J. 566
(1992).
194 Id. The court stated:
Before filing suit, an attorney is obligated to make reasonable efforts
to ascertain the pertinent facts and to evaluate them in the light of the
applicable law. Cf.R. 1:4-8; see RPC 1.1, 1.3, 3.1 ("A lawyer shall not
bring or defend a proceeding, nor assert or controvert an issue
therein unless the lawyer knows or reasonably believes that there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith
argument for extension, modification or reversal of existing law.").
195 The court stated:
Since plaintiff acted in reliance on her attorney's advice, whether
plaintiff or her attorney is ultimately responsible for the financial consequences of pursuing frivolous litigation will depend on whether
plaintiff's answers to her attorney's questions were accurate and complete. However, that is a matter which cannot be determined in this
litigation.
McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino, A-4057-90TI (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div., decided Jan. 17, 1992), certif granted, 127 N.J. 566 (1992), slip op. at 8-9
n. 3.
196 McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino, A-4057-90T1 (N. J.
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the plaintiff's petition for certification, which belatedly raised questions concerning the statute's constitutionality. 97 The case is expected to be argued and decided in this year's court term.
The only case thus far to address any of the constitutional issues concerning the frivolous claims statute is the law division opinion in Fagasv. Scott, which upheld the statute against a challenge that
it violated the exclusive authority of the New Jersey Supreme Court
over rulemaking and discipline of attorneys. 1 98 The facts of the
case, as depicted in the trial court's impassioned opinion, were outrageous. A wealthy retired businessman formed a relationship with
a prosperous businesswoman and lived with her in her home in what
the judge described as "a non-marital, fully informed, intimate social relationship" for five years. The woman ultimately chose to
break off the relationship and asked the man to move out, which he
refused to do.' 9 9 She filed a complaint seeking to eject him, to
which he responded by raising a defense and various counterclaims,
including a claim that he was entitled to a one-half interest in her
residence. The assertion of these claims forestalled the issuance of
an order to eject the defendant and engendered almost two years of
litigation, a twelve-day trial and the expenditure of $160,000 in legal
fees and expenses by the plaintiff.2"' In his extensive findings of
fact, the judge found that the course of the litigation revealed that
the defendant knew his claims were without factual basis, and that
he "had malicious motives, was unfair, desired to destroy plaintiff,
stole from plaintiff, and had a plan to get from the court system,
which he knew that he was improperly burdening, what he had not
' 20 '
been able to get from the plaintiff by contract.
The defendant, represented by new counsel on the frivolous
claims motion, 20 2 raised numerous issues concerning the applicability and constitutionality of the frivolous claims statute in response to
the plaintiff's motion for attorney fees and expenses. In particular,
the defendant argued that the statutory definition of a frivolous
claim "is confined to legal insufficiency. ' 20 ' The Fagas court reSuper. Ct. App. Div., decided Jan. 17, 1992) (King, P.J.A.D., concurring), certif
granted, 127 N.J. 566 (1992).
197 See Petition for Certification and Appendix on Behalf of Plaintiff-Appellant,
McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino.
198 251 N.J. Super. 169, 597 A.2d 571 (Law Div. 1991).
199 Id. at 177, 597 A.2d at 575.
200 Id. at 177-79, 597 A.2d at 575-76.
201 Id. at 179, 597 A.2d at 576.
202 See id. at 176, 597 A.2d at 575.
203 Id. at 189, 597 A.2d at 581-82. There is no indication in the trial court's
opinion that the legislative history on this point was discussed.

19921

FRIVOLOUS CLAIMS STATUTE

jected this contention as "frivolous," noting that the courts construing the statute indicate that "a pleading containing knowingly false
allegations is a pleading 'without any reasonable basis in law or equity.' "204 In addition to finding that the factual insufficiency of the
defendant's claims violated subsection (b)(2) of the statute, the
court stated that the defendant had violated subsection (b)(1) because his claims "were commenced, used and continued in bad
faith: (i) solely for the purpose of harassment; (ii) for the purpose of
delaying his removal from the rent-free house; and (iii) to inflict malicious injury on the plaintiff."2 5
The judge also rejected the defendant's arguments that the frivolous claims statute was invalid as an encroachment upon two areas
of supreme court authority under the judiciary article of the 1947
New Jersey Constitution: the supreme court's rule-making authority
and the authority of the court over the admission to practice and
discipline of attorneys. The court concluded that the frivolous
claims statute is a legitimate exercise of legislative power under New
Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9(a)(8), which sanctions an award of attorney
fees where permitted by statute. The court regarded the statute as
filling the gap left by the court rule. °6 Fagas appears to present the
paradigm situation in which an award of attorney fees should be
permitted: a malicious litigant with ulterior motives pressing factually baseless claims at great cost to his adversary. On reflection,
however, this case raises questions about trial courts' ability, or willingness, to control litigants' conduct in such a way as to avoid protracted litigation that ultimately results in a finding of frivolousness.
The Fagas opinion notes that the plaintiff made two applications for
interim relief to remove the defendant from her home pending the
outcome of the litigation. Both applications were denied, by judges
other than the judge who finally adjudicated the case on the merits.
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that several judicial
decisions construing the frivolous claims statute are, in certain respects, inconsistent with the statute's legislative history. The statute's extension to cases involving meritless factual claims constitutes
the most startling divergence between the statute as enacted and the
statute as interpreted. The great dispute in the Legislature over this
divergence resulted in the deletion of the phrase "false allegations
of fact" from the definition of sanctionable claims in subsection
Id. at 191, 597 A.2d at 582.
Id. at 190, 597 A.2d 582-83.
206 Id. at 210, 597 A.2d at 584-86. The discussion of the constitutional issues is
undertaken infra notes 223-284 and accompanying text.
204
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200

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:153

(b)(2) of the statute. The judicial opinions applying the statute do
not discuss this point but appear to have merely assumed that the
requirement that a claim have a "reasonable basis in law or equity"
was intended to encompass the entire basis of a party's claim - the
basis in law as well as the facts that underlie it.
In the most significant example of this approach, the Sjogren
court, extensively relying upon federal cases in awarding attorney
fees and costs against a plaintiff for asserting a factually-baseless
claim, maintained that the frivolous claims statute is patterned after
Rule I1 2°7 The appellate division opinion in lannone also turned to
Rule 11 jurisprudence, and the assumption is apparent throughout
the opinion that factually baseless claims are within the statute's
scope.2 °8 The court in Fagas relied upon Evans, Sjogren and lannone
in holding that the statute applies to the factual basis for a party's
claim and rejected as "frivolous" and "unfounded" the argument
that the statute is limited to legally-baseless claims.2 °9
The second major point of divergence between judicial opinions and the statute's legislative history is the suggestion in Evans v.
PrudentialProperty and Casualty Co. 210 and the holding in an unreported case 2 1 ' that the statute permits awards against attorneys and
law firms as well as against litigants themselves. As observed above,
the statute does not explicitly authorize awards against attorneys,
and the Sponsor's Statement to the bill states that an award under
the statute may be assessed against "the nonprevailing person."212
It is significant that on both of these major points of divergence
some courts have interpreted the statute as consistent with Rule 11,
despite the New Jersey statute's difference in language, scope and
purpose from the federal rule. Furthermore, the willingness of
these courts to enthusiastically embrace the statute, and assume that
it is broader than its language and legislative history warrants, is a
curious phenomenon, given the historical reluctance of the New
Jersey Supreme Court to adopt a court rule that would authorize
207 Sjogren, Inc. v. Caterina Insurance Agency, 244 NJ. Super. 369, 373, 582 A.2d
841, 843 (Ch. Div. 1990).
208 See lannone v. McHale, 245 NJ. Super. 17, 583 A.2d 770 (App. Div. 1990).
209 See Fagas v. Scott, 251 N.J. Super. 169, 190, 597 A.2d 571, 582 (Law Div.
1991).
210 233 N.J. Super. 652, 665 n.3, 559 A.2d 888, 894-95 n.3 (Law Div. 1989).
211 Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Karabell, No. L-2142-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div.), 127 NJ.L.J. 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div., Jan. 24, 1991). See Kathleen Bird,
"N.J. Frivolous-Suit Law Upheld by Angry Judge," 129 NJ.L.J. 489 (October 17,
1991).
212 See Sponsor's Statement, supra at note 124.
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attorney fee awards in precisely these types of situations.21 3
The reported opinions are also interesting for the issues they
do not address. For example, subsection (b)(2) of the statute provides that a claim is frivolous if "[t]he nonprevailing party knew or
should have known" that the claim "was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."
None of the cases thus far decided have focused on the language
concerning the nonprevailing party's knowledge. Judge Pressler's
opinion in Iannone raises in a footnote the question whether a "lay
client who believes himself to be aggrieved [can] ever know or be
chargeable with knowledge" of a claim's legal baselessness. 2 14 The
Somerset Trust court and the Iannone trial court appear to have done
just that, ordering awards of attorney fees without making any finding as to the parties' actual knowledge concerning the lack of a basis
"in law or equity" for the assertion of their claims.2 15 Were these
courts imputing to the parties the (presumed) knowledge of their
attorneys that their claims were legally baseless? If so, the rule in
malicious use of process actions - that a party's reliance on an attorney's opinion as to the existence of probable cause for an action
immunizes the party from liability - has been turned inside out. A
litigant who relies upon an attorney's opinion as to the legal basis
for a claim (or the existence of a good faith argument to extend the
law) does so at the risk that the attorney's judgment will later be
second-guessed and found to be wrong, and the party will be liable
for a frivolous claims award. This is precisely the situation in which
the appellate division in McKeown-Brand upheld an award of attorney
fees. Only in Judge King's concurring opinion are the potential due
process problems with this result mentioned.
Furthermore, the reported cases fail to discuss the relationship
between the frivolous claims statute and attorney liability for malpractice or disciplinary infractions. May a client against whom an
attorney fee award has been made on the ground of legal baselessness recoup the award in a malpractice action against the attorney?
It would seem that if a court makes an express finding under the
frivolous claims statute that a nonprevailing party "knew or should
have known" that a claim was without legal basis, it ought to follow
in all but the most unusual cases that the party's attorney "knew or
See discussion at infra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
214 245 N.J. Super. 17, 30 n. 4, 583 A.2d at 770, 776-77 n.4 (1990).
215 See Somerset Trust Co. v. Sternberg, 238 N.J. Super. 279, 560 A.2d 849 (App.
Div. 1989); lannone v. McHale, 236 N.J. Super. 227, 565 A.2d 422 (Law Div. 1989).
213
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should have known" of the claim's legal baselessness. Thus, it would
be very difficult for the attorney to argue in a subsequent malpractice action that the attorney had met the minimum standard of care
in advising the client to assert the claim.21 6
The relationship between an award under the New Jersey frivolous claims statute and the attorney disciplinary rules has not yet
been established. Has an attorney automatically committed an ethics violation if a claim advanced by the attorney on behalf of a client
is found to have been frivolous? The Wisconsin courts have not
equated the imposition of sanctions under the Wisconsin frivolous
claims statute with an ethics violation because that state's disciplinary system requires a higher standard of proof for a finding of an
ethics violation than the mere evaluation of an attorney's conduct in
asserting a baseless claim.2 17 Whether the same disparity in standards will be found to exist under New Jersey law is unclear. None
of the courts that have construed the New Jersey frivolous claims
statute have ruled on the evidentiary standard applicable to a finding that a "nonprevailing party . . . knew or should have known"
that a claim was legally baseless. Presumably, the standard being
applied sub silentio is simply one of a preponderance of the evidence.
In New Jersey attorney disciplinary matters, ethics violations
must be proved by the higher, "clear and convincing evidence"
standard. 2 8 The frivolousness standards under the statute and the
disciplinary rules are very similar, however. The current New Jersey
disciplinary rule is a modified version of RPC 3.1, the successor provision to DR 7-102(A)(1) and (2), on which the Wisconsin frivolous
claims statute was based. This rule provides that an attorney should
not assert a claim on behalf of a client "unless the lawyer knows or
reasonably believes that there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law." If it is found that a client "knew
216 See, e.g., Gautam v. De Luca, 215 N.J. Super. 388, 396-97, 521 A.2d 1343,
1347 (App. Div. 1987) (maintaining that although not a guarantor against judgment errors, "an attorney is required to exercise on his client's behalf the knowledge, skill and ability ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the legal
profession similarly situated and to utilize reasonable care and prudence"); Lamb v.
Barbour, 188 N.J. Super. 6, 12, 455 A.2d 1122, 1125 (App. Div. 1982), certif denied,
93 N.J. 297, 460 A.2d 693 (1983) (same). Note that if an attorney is found liable for
an award under the frivolous claims statute, either directly or in a subsequent malpractice action, the attorney's malpractice insurance may not cover the award. See
CaryJ. Coglianese, Note, Insuring Rule 11 Sanctions, 88 MICH. L. REV. 344 (1989).
217 See discussion of this issue with respect to the Wisconsin frivolous claims statute, supra at note 58 and accompanying text.
218 E.g., In re Rigolosi, 107 N.J. 192, 526 A.2d 670 (1987); In re Shaw, 88 N.J. 433,
443 A.2d 670 (1982).
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or should have known" that the client's claim was legally baseless,
does it follow that the client's attorney necessarily violated the disciplinary rule requirement of a reasonable belief that the claim was
not frivolous? In McKeown-Brand, the appellate division refused to
address this question directly, stating that the issue of liability between attorney and client "could not be determined in this litigation. ' 2 1" The court suggested, however, that if a client's answers to
an attorney's questions are "accurate and complete," the attorney is
"ultimately responsible for the financial consequences of pursuing
frivolous litigation. 2
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE FRIVOLOUS
CLAIMS STATUTE

The New Jersey frivolous claims statute implicates two distinct areas of the New Jersey Supreme Court's authority under
the state constitution. Both areas are set forth in section two,
paragraph three of the judicial article, which provides: "The
Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of
all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and
procedure in all such courts. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted." '1 2 1 Only the New Jersey Superior
Court, Law Division opinion in Fagas has thus far addressed the
constitutionality of the frivolous claims statute; the court held
that the statute does not impinge either upon the authority of the
supreme court to make rules governing practice and procedure
or the court's authority over the attorney discipline.2 2 2 Predicting whether the supreme court itself will agree with these conclusions requires some extended analysis, as both areas of the
court's constitutional authority have been the subject of a great
deal of rule-making and adjudication since the adoption of the
1947 constitution.
A.

The New Jersey Supreme Court's authority to make rules of practice
and procedure
It is clear from the history of the 1947 New Jersey Constitu-

219 McKeown-Brand v. Trump Castle Hotel and Casino, A-4057-90T1 (N. J.
Super. Ct. App. Div., decided Jan. 17, 1992), slip op. at 8-9 n. 3, certif granted, 127
NJ. 566 (1992).
220 Id.
221 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2 par. 3 (1947).
222 See Fagas v. Scott, 251 N.J. Super. 169, 597 A.2d 571 (Law Div. 1991).
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tion that the drafters of the judiciary article intended that the
rulemaking authority of the New Jersey Supreme Court be subject to overriding legislation.223 This intent is manifested in the
phrase "subject to the law," which modifies the clause giving the
court the power to make rules of practice and procedure. It is
equally clear that the court's first Chief Justice, Arthur T. Vanderbilt, believed that subjecting the court rules to legislative
override or modification was simply wrong. 224 Vanderbilt was
unable to convince the drafters of the judiciary article to eliminate the phrase "subject to the law," but he conformed the political alignment of the legislature and the judiciary to fit his own
views after the fact. Only two years after becoming Chief Justice,
Vanderbilt wrote the majority opinion in Winbeny v. Salisbury, a
case involving a conflict between a court rule and a statute.225
Vanderbilt wrote that the phrase "subject to the law" did not
mean that court rules were subject to overriding legislation, but
meant only that court rules are confined to matters of procedure,
and that the court may not make substantive law "wholesale"
through the enactment of court rules.2 2 6 The court's rulemaking
223 See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan & WarrenJ. Greene, The Legislature'sRelation tojudicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234 (1951).

224 A long-time advocate of political reform, Arthur T. Vanderbilt proved to be a
significant force behind the adoption of the 1947 constitution through his continuous agitation for constitutional revision. On the subject of Vanderbilt's involvement in the revision of the state constitution, see Voorhees E. Dunn, Jr., Chief
Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt and the Judicial Revolution in New Jersey (University
Microfilms International 1987) (Rutgers University Ph.D. thesis) (hereinafter Dunn,
The Judicial Revolution); EUGENE C. GERHART, ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT: THE COM-

PLEAT COUNSELLOR (1980); Kermit Smith, The Politics of Judicial Reform in New
Jersey (University Microfilms International 1964) (Princeton University Ph.D. thesis); ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT II, CHANGING LAw: A BIOGRAPHY OF ARTHUR T. VAN-

DERBILT (1976). Vanderbilt's distrust of the legislative branch no doubt arose in
part from the Legislature's resolute obstruction of his efforts to achieve constitutional reform. See Dunn, The Judicial Revolution, supra at 41-61, 72-110.
225 5 N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950). At issue in Winbery was a conflict between a
court rule that provided a 45-day period for the filing of an appeal from a trial
court, and a statute which provided for a one-year period in which to appeal.
226 This approach was a knowing misconstruction on Vanderbilt's part. The
Committee on the Judiciary, chaired by NathanJacobs, who was later to become an
associate justice of the supreme court, sent Vanderbilt a draft of the proposedjudiciary article that "subject to law" made the court rule-making authority concerning
administration and practice and procedure rules. Vanderbilt, replying by letter,
objected to the inclusion of the qualifying phrase: "The rule-making power... is

made subject to legislative control by the words 'subject to law.' The trend
throughout the United States has been to confide the rule-making power to the
highest court and to hold that court responsible for results. I therefore suggest the
deletion of the phrase 'subject to law.' " Dunn, The Judicial Revolution, supra note
224, at 152.
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power, Vanderbilt stated, "is not subject to overriding legislation. '"227

Despite widespread acknowledgment that the Winberry

decision was, at best, a questionable interpretation of the judicial
article, 228 Vanderbilt's distinction between the court's rulemaking power over practice and procedure and the legislature's authority over matters of substantive law has remained the
operative 229dividing line between judicial and legislative
authority.
One area that the court immediately circumscribed within its
exclusive rulemaking authority was awards of attorney fees.
Counsel fee awards were of great concern to Vanderbilt. Fore227 Winberry, 5 N.J. at 255, 74 A.2d at 414. Vanderbilt's knowing misconstruction of the judiciary article was no doubt motivated by the legislature's passage of a
number of bills relating to court practice and administration; Vanderbilt believed
that such bills threatened the foundations of the new judicial system. Dunn, The
Judicial Revolution, supra note 224 at 189. All of the bills were vetoed by Governor
Alfred E. Driscoll, who had been Vanderbilt's political ally in achieving constitutional reform. Vanderbilt wrote Driscoll a letter of thanks. Id. at 186-89. One of
the vetoed bills sought to restore the authority of the courts hearing equity matters
to award attorney fees; such authority had been expressly abrogated by a 1949
amendment to the court rules. See Joseph M. Lynch, The New Jersey Supreme Court and
the Counsel Fees Rule: Procedure or Substance and Remedy? (Part I), 4 SETON HALL L. REV.
19, 30 (1972) [hereinafter Lynch I].
228 See, e.g.,
Benjamin Kaplan & WarrenJ. Greene, The Legislature's Relation tojudicial Rule-Making: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARV. L. REV. 234 (1951);
EliJ. Warach, Note, The Rule-Making Power: Subject to Law?, 5 RUTGERS L. REV. 376
(1951). Former Governor Robert Meyner, a political adversary of Vanderbilt, once
commented:
Vanderbilt was so imbued with the idea that the Supreme Court be
supreme that he was willing to overlook the previous interpretation
he had given to the judiciary clause .... [He] was so fearful of legislative action that he was willing to distort the language of the Constitution. This I believe to have been a sheer grasp for power.
Dunn, The Judicial Revolution, supra note 224, at 221-22. See also Lynch I, supra
note 227, at 30 (referring to Winberry as a "constitutional coup d'etat").
229 While the invocation of Winberry isable to command a majority of the court,
expressions of dissatisfaction with the decision and in particular its distinction between "substance" and "procedure" are a regular occurrence, starting with Winberry itself. See, e.g., Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 267, 74 A.2d 406, 420 (1950)
(Case, A.J., concurring in result) (objecting to the majority opinion as "swerved by
the impulse to find a way of reaching a desired result"); Busik v. Levine, 63 N.J.
351, 307 A.2d 571 (1973) (a majority of the court concurred in the result, which
upheld an award of prejudgment interest in tort actions pursuant to a court rule.
Hall, J., concurred in the result but argued that court rules that implicated both
procedure and substance should "be worked out in advance cooperatively between
the three branches of government;" and Conford, P.J.A.D., temporarily assigned,
dissented, suggesting that if the Winberry distinction between substance and procedure was to be retained, the court should carefully avoid rulemaking that touched
upon areas of substance). See also the discussion of the "counsel fee cases," infra at
notes 223-27 and accompanying text.
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most among his many criticisms of the New Jersey courts in the
pre- 1947 era was the practice that prevailed in the chancery
courts of discretionary awards of counsel fees to successful litigants. The practice was regarded as the occasion for frequent
abuse and exercise of political favoritism. 23 0 Not surprisingly,
when Vanderbilt became Chief Justice, a 1949 amendment to the
Rules of Practice and Procedure expressly abrogated this discretionary authority. 23 ' A 1950 amendment deleted a further specific provision that
permitted an award of counsel fees if
"provided by law." ' 23 2
In 1953, State v. Otis Elevator Co. 2 33 raised questions regarding both the court's authority to regulate the allowance of counsel fees by rules of practice and procedure, and the Legislature's
authority to regulate such awards by statute. Vanderbilt wrote
the majority opinion, which proceeded from the assumption that
the allowance of counsel fees had always been "a matter of procedure rather than of substantive law." ' 234 Chief Justice Vanderbilt declared that the court rules were therefore "the exclusive
source of authority for the allowance of counsel fees ... "235 In
See State v. Otis Elevator Co., 12 N.J. 1, 10, 95 A.2d 715, 719 (1953).
See N.J. CT. R. 3:54-7 (1948), as amendedJanuary 21, 1949. Any question as
to the inherent authority of the courts to award counsel fees was resolved negatively in Liberty Title and Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J. 28, 77 A.2d 219 (1950), decided shortly after Winberry.
232 See N.J. CT. R. 3:54-7(d) (1948). For an extensive discussion of the court's
rulemaking and adjudications regarding counsel fees see Lynch I, supra note 227;
Joseph M. Lynch, The New Jersey Supreme Court and the Counsel Fees Rule: Procedure or
Substance and Remedy? (Part II), 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 421 (1972) [hereinafter Lynch
II]. Professor Lynch is highly critical of the court's activity on this subject; he demonstrates the inconsistencies in the adjudicated cases and the problems created by
the supreme court's position that counsel fees are a matter of practice and procedure. Using the extended case study of the court's rules and decisions regarding
counsel fees, Lynch makes the larger point that the court's insulation of its rulemaking authority from legislative scrutiny has resulted in an abrogation of power by
the court, with no effective review by other branches of government. See id. at 49297.
233 12 N.J. 1, 95 A.2d 715 (1953). The State brought an action under the Escheat
Act to claim a large amount of stock held by Otis Elevator in the name of a decedent. The proceeding resulted in an award of the stock to the state. Otis Elevator
requested the court to award counsel fees under the provision of New Jersey Court
Rule 3:54-7, which permitted such allowances "out of a fund in court." The Escheat Act provided for allowance of counsel fees only to the attorney appointed to
prosecute the escheat action on behalf of the state. The trial court denied Otis
Elevator's request for counsel fees under the rule, and the company appealed. On
appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial court, holding that Otis Elevator was
entitled to an award of counsel fees out of the proceeds of the escheated stock.
234 Otis Elevator, 12 N.J. at 5, 95 A.2d at 717 (citations omitted).
235 Id. at 7, 95 A.2d at 718.
230
231
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dissent, Justice Nathan Jacobs argued that the categories of substance and procedure staked out in Winberny were not easily distinguished.2 36 Justice Jacobs proposed that the court adopt a
principle of judicial deference to the legislature in cases where
substance and procedure were closely interwoven and the subject
matter reflected "important statutory policies in fields which are
of special legislative concern. '"237

One of the broad statements in Vanderbilt's majority opinion in Otis Elevator Co. has particular relevance to the constitutional issues raised by the frivolous claims statute. The opinion
declares that "[t]his is the first case in which it has been contended that counsel fees are a matter of substantive law." '2 3 8 This

broad statement ignored the court's approval of an attorney fee
award as damages in a tort action only a short time before Otis
Elevator was decided. In Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp.,239 the
236 Id. at 24, 95 A.2d at 727. Justice Jacobs, however, was well aware of Vanderbilt's change of position with respect to the rulemaking authority. Although he was
not yet a member of the supreme court when Winberry was decided, Justice Jacobs
had been counsel to the Judiciary Committee of the 1947 Constitution. Justice
Heher concurred in the reasoning and opinion ofJustice Jacobs, and wrote a separate dissenting opinion as well, arguing that escheat actions were clearly matters of
substance as they implicated the state's sovereign immunity rights. Id. at 31-37, 95
A.2d at 730-34 (Heher, J., dissenting). The court's 4-2 split on the counsel fees
issue became a 4-3 split only a short time later, when Associate Justice William
Brennan was appointed to the court and joined in the dissent ofJustices Jacobs and
Heher in a similar case involving an attorney fees award. See State v. U.S. Steel Co.,
12 N.J. 51, 95 A.2d 740 (1953); see also Dunn, supra note 224, at 309-10 (quoting
extensively from a letter sent by Associate Justice William Brennan to Vanderbilt
explaining his dissent in State v. U.S. Steel Co.). Justice Brennan presented his own
view that Winberry was incorrectly decided, and stated that he would not have voted
in the majority had he been on the court at that time. Justice Brennan suggested
that Jacobs was of the same view. Brennan stated that Jacobs accepted Winberry
" as settled law and reserved only the decision case by case whether its containment by application of the doctrine of judicial deference is indicated in the given
circumstances.' " Id. at 310.
237 Otis Elevator, 12 N.J. at 25, 95 A.2d at 727 (Jacobs,J., dissenting). The suggestion that the court defer to the Legislature horrified Vanderbilt, who characterized
such deference as an abdication of the court's constitutional responsibility. Id. at
16, 95 A.2d at 723. Vanderbilt commented that "[t]he victory of the people in
supplanting the judicial discretion that controlled the granting of the old prerogative writs will prove illusory indeed if it merely gives place to the much criticized
federal doctrine ofjudicial deference." Id. at 17, 95 A.2d at 723. In his non-judicial
writings Vanderbilt extended this argument, declaring that the doctrine ofjudicial
deference threatened the independence of the judiciary. See ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE

(1953).
238 Otis Elevator, 12 N.J. at 5, 95 A.2d at 717.
239 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952), aff'g per curiam 15 N.J. Super. 139, 83 A.2d
246 and 15 N.J. Super. 337, 83 A.2d 366 (Ch. Div. 1951).
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supreme court affirmed per curiam the trial court opinion in an
action for malicious use of process. The lower court had included a counsel fee award in favor of the successful party, stating that in a malicious use of process action where "special
damages" are shown, "the well nigh universal rule is that reasonable costs and counsel fees incurred in defending the action maliciously brought, are an element of damage.

' 240

In 1978, the

supreme court reaffirmed the Mayflower Industries holding in The
Penwag Property Co., Inc. v. Landau.2 4 ' Moreover, the court applied
the Mayflower Industries decision to a tort action for fraudulent
nondisclosure in the sale of realty in Department of Environmental
Protection v. Ventron,2 42 where the court held that " '[o]ne who

through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against
a third person'" may be awarded attorney fees as damages. 43
Thus, where attorney fees are a traditional element of damages
for a tort, the court is willing to regard them as an unstated exception to the court rule's general prohibition against counsel fee
awards. It would be going too far, however, to say that the court
regards damages in a tort action as a matter of "substance." In
Busik v. Levine, 24 4 decided in 1973, a seriously divided court upheld its rule regulating awards of prejudgment interest in tort
actions, with the plurality opinion taking the position
" '[d]amages' constitute a 'remedy.' And 'remedy' promptly con24 5
notes procedure.

240 Mayflower Industries, 15 N.J. Super. at 175, 83 A.2d at 264. The court pointed
out that the elements of a malicious prosecution action must be established, including a "special grievance," i.e., damages above and beyond the costs and attorney
fees expended in defending the original action. In Mayflower Industries, the special
grievance was the issuance of an injunction that prevented the successful party
from operating its business. Id. at 152, 83 A.2d at 252.
241 76 N.J. 595, 388 A.2d 1265 (1978). The Penwag Property court stated that
"counsel fees and costs in defending the action maliciously brought may be an element of damage in a successful malicious prosecution [action], but do not in themselves constitute a special grievance necessary to make out the cause of action." Id.
at 598, 388 A.2d at 1266 (citing Mayflower Industries v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super.
139, 175-76, 83 A.2d 264 (Ch. Div. 1951)).
242 94 N.J. 473, 504-05, 468 A.2d 150, 166 (1983).
243 Id. at 504-05, 468 A.2d at 166 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 194(2) (1977)). The court held that an award of attorney fees was appropriate in
an action for fraudulent nondisclosure in the sale of realty, where the pollution
caused by a seller resulted in the buyer having to defend an environmental clean-up
action brought by the Department of Environmental Protection. Id.
244 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571 (1973).
245 In Busik, two justices joined Chief Justice Weintraub's plurality opinion upholding the rule. Twojustices concurred in the result on the grounds that prejudgment interest fell in the gray area between substance and procedure, and that the
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After Otis Elevator Co., counsel fee awards remained a frequent source of supreme court rulemaking and adjudication. In
both areas, the court has consistently refused to adopt either the

"English" approach of a general fee-shifting provision or a rule
permitting awards of attorney fees for the assertion of unmeritorious claims.2 46 New Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9 currently expresses this view. The rule concerning awards of attorney fees,
which provides in subsection (a) that except as expressly provided in the rule, "[n]o fee for legal services shall be allowed in
the taxed costs" in a civil action.2 4 7
The supreme court's stalwart opposition to legislative enactments on the subject of attorney fee awards has abated somewhat
since the Vanderbilt era. In 1975, with little fanfare, the court
added subsection (a)(8) to New Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9, which
provides that counsel fees may be awarded "as permitted by statute." Was the addition of this subsection intended as a signal
court rule was permissible because the legislature had never acted in the area. One
justice joined judge Conford's dissenting opinion, directly challenging Winbery and
commenting that "prejudgment interest on a tort award ... is in the area of damages and therefore on principle clearly assimilable to the field of substantive right
rather than procedure ....
".Id. at 378, 307 A.2d at 586 (Conford, P.J.A.D.,
dissenting).
246 See, e.g., Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Co., 48 NJ. 291, 301, 225 A.2d 328, 334
(1966) (maintaining that court rules as "originally adopted ... embraced the view
that sound judicial administration will best be advanced by having each litigant bear
his own counsel fee"); Sunset Beach Amusement Corp. v. Belk, 33 NJ. 162, 167,
162 A.2d 834, 837 (1960) (observing that award of counsel fees as sanction for
suing or defending "in manifest bad faith has much to commend it, yet the problem
of confining allowances to precisely that situation in actual practice would be a formidable one"). See also the discussion in Pressler, supra note 102, R. 4:42-9, Comment at 997-98. A significant example of the court's continued resistance on this
subject is the 1966 Judicial Conference, where a proposal by the Bar Association to
broaden the availability of attorney fee awards was considered. ChiefJustice Weintraub effectively spiked the proposal with virtually no discussion except for lecture
on the pre-1947 abuses of discretionary awards of counsel fees and on the problem
of the "fair haired boy," the award of counsel fees for political and personal favoritism. The ChiefJustice referred to the "full scale scandal" that existed in the chancery courts prior to the 1947 constitution and asked: "Are we so matured today and
so cleansed of motivation that we can assume that we will not be influenced by
identification with individual lawyers in making that kind of a decision? How far
will we frighten litigants." Administrative Office of the Courts of New Jersey, Annual Judicial Conference 1, 4-5 (Morning Session, June 16, 1966). See Lynch II,
supra note 232, at 437-43.
247 Subsections (a)(l) through (a)(6) of NJ. CT. R. 4:42-9 authorize awards of
attorney fees in family, mortgage and tax foreclosure, insurance liability and probate actions and where there is "a fund in court." These provisions may be described generally as "fee-shifting" provisions as they are not triggered by wrongful
conduct on the part of the party seeking an award. Subsection (a)(7) provides for
an award of attorney fees where otherwise provided by the court rules.
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that the court considered Otis Elevator to have been wrongly decided? Clearly, the answer is no. The discussion of subsection
(a)(8) at the 1974 Judicial Conference suggested that the new
subsection was regarded as a form of permission to the legislature to act in this area.2 4 8 There was no sign that the legislature
thought it needed such permission, however, as it was noted during the 1974 Judicial Conference that some 68 statutes providing
for awards of attorney fees had been enacted since 1947.249 In

Coleman v. Fiore Bros., Inc. ,250 decided in 1989, the New Jersey
Supreme Court held that an award of attorney fees under the
provisions of one such statute was proper without expressing any
concern that the statute might impinge upon the court's constitutional authority. 5 '
In addition to New Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9, provisions permitting awards of attorney fees as sanctions for wrongful litigation conduct are scattered throughout the New Jersey Court
Rules.2 52 Of particular interest among these court rules is New
248 The subsection had been recommended for adoption by the state supreme
court's Civil Practice Committee, and was presented for discussion at the 1974 Judicial Conference. The presentation was made by formerJudge Alfred Clapp, then
the chair of the Civil Practice Committee and an active participant in the revision of
the court rules at the time of the 1947 Constitution and continuously thereafter.
Judge Clapp's comments on the addition of this subsection are somewhat cryptic;
surprisingly, he commented that the addition of the subsection did not involve
"major change." Judge Clapp reviewed the history of the court's attitude toward
attorney fee awards, and stated that the purpose of the new subsection was "to
avoid conflict." In noting the post-1947 adoption of 68 attorney fee statutes, Clapp
commented: "So far we have avoided one of the confrontations and the suggestions
of the legislature are all quite in order in my view." Administrative Office of the
Courts of New Jersey, 26th Annual Judicial Conference, May 24, 1947 Transcript
(unpaginated) (transcript on file with the SETON HALL LAW REVIEW).
249 Id. A 1991 survey identified over 200 New Jersey statutes that provide for
awards of attorney fees in specific type of actions and proceedings. See Kevin P.
Duffy, 201 NewJersey Counsel Fee Statutes, 127 N.J.L.J. 340 (Feb. 7, 1991). The
Comment to NJ. CT. R. 4:42-9 cites a plethora of cases in which attorney fees were
awarded under statutes. See Pressler, supra note 102, at R. 4:42-9, Comment at
1006-1009.
250 113 N.J. 594 (1989).
251 See id.
252 New Jersey Court Rule 2:11-4 permits an attorney fee award as a sanction
against a party who violates the rules governing the prosecution of appeals. New
Jersey Court Rule 4:17-5(d) provides for an award of attorney fees and costs necessitated by a motion "made frivolously or for the purpose of delay" with respect to
objections to interrogatories; New Jersey Court Rule 4:23-3 permits awards of attorney fees and other expenses for various kinds of failure in the discovery process.
Mention should also be made of New Jersey Court Rule 4:58, relating to an offer of
judgment. The rule was originally based upon FED. R. Civ. P. 68, but has since
been significantly amended. The New Jersey rule provides a mechanism whereby
an offer of judgment may be made prior to trial, and if it is not accepted and the
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Jersey Court Rule 1:4-8. This rule is an analog of the original
version of Federal Rule 11; it states that an attorney or pro se
party who signs a pleading or motion thereby certifies "that he
has read the pleading or motion; that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to support it;
that it does not contain scandalous or indecent matter; and that it
is not interposed for delay." Like its original federal counterpart,
the rule also provides that a pleading or motion that is either
unsigned or signed "with intent to defeat the purpose" of the
rule may be stricken. A "willful violation" of Rule 1:4-8 may result in a contempt proceeding against a pro se party, and both a
contempt proceeding and disciplinary action against an attorney.
The New Jersey rule suffers the same deficiency as its pre-1983
Federal Rule 11 counterpart in that it does not provide a remedy
that benefits a litigant who is aggrieved by conduct that violates
the rule. In Berthelsen v. Hall,2 5 3 the New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, held that the contempt and disciplinary remedies specified in Rule 1:4-8 are exclusive, and vacated a trial
court order directing an attorney to pay out-of-pocket costs to a
defendant "when 'there was no basis for the suit.' "254 The court
noted that unlike Rule 1:4-8, the post-1983 Federal Rule expressly provides for awards of attorney fees, as do several federal
statutes and state frivolous claims statutes of other jurisdictions.2 5 5 The Berthelsen court rejected the approach taken by the
New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, a few years earlier in Atkinson v. Pittsgrove Township,2 5 6 in which the court relied
on "the inherent power" of a chancery court as authority for imposing on a vexatious pro se litigant a monetary penalty payable
2 57
to the court.
offering party receives a verdict more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the nonoffering party is liable for interest and an attorney fee not to exceed $750. The
Commentary to N.J. CT. R. 4:42-9 describes this rule as a mechanism for providing
counsel fees in cases of frivolous or bad faith claims, but such a characterization is
not apparent on the face of the rule. See Pressler, supra note 102, at R.4:42-9, Commentary at 998.
253 194 N.J. Super. 22, 475 A.2d 1275 (App. Div. 1984).
254 Id. at 23, 475 A.2d at 1276.
255 The court cited 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, as well as several
state frivolous claims statutes, including the Wisconsin statute. Id. at 24, 475 A.2d
at 1277.
256 193 N.J. Super. 23, 471 A.2d 1215 (Ch. Div. 1983).
257 In Atkinson, a pro se litigant sought to assert claims arising out of an in rem tax
foreclosure suit that had been previously rejected in both federal court and state
court. After a hearing, the court made a specific finding that the plaintiff brought
the action in bad faith. 193 N.J. Super. at 26, 471 A.2d 1216. The court's holding
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The rules governing summary judgment motions are also of
particular interest with regard to the frivolous claims statute.
New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-5(b), analogous to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(e), permits awards of reasonable expenses,
including attorney fees, caused by the submission of an affidavit
"in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay."' 258 Added in
1983, New Jersey Court Rule 4:46-6, permits an attorney fee
award to a prevailing party in an action tried to conclusion if the
party has previously made a motion for summary judgment that
was unsuccessful "based on a factual contention raised in bad
faith by the party opposing the motion with knowledge that it was
a palpable sham or predicated on facts known or which should

have been known by him to be false." '2 59 The commentary to the

rule constitutes a brief of the court's negative position on the
that it had the inherent authority to impose a monetary sanction on a pro se litigant
is questionable. The court did not cite N.J. CT. R. 1:4-8, which expressly authorizes
contempt proceedings against pro se litigants for willful violation of the provision
that the signature on a pleading constitutes a certification that there is good ground
to support the pleading. The Atkinson court considered N.J. CT. R. 4:42-9, which
governs attorney fees awards, and concluded that the rule did not preclude other
relief in the form of sanctions. The court stated that it "has the power and duty to
protect the purity and efficiency of its own processes against the type of conduct
pursued by plaintiff herein. The court has the inherent power to protect itself and
litigants against harassment and vexacious litigation and an abuse of process." Id.
at 32, 471 A.2d at 1219 (citing Masholie v. River Edge, 135 N.J.Eq. 193, 199, 37
A.2d 861, 864 (Ch. 1944), aff'd 136 N.J. Eq. 118, 40 A.2d at 627 (E & A 1945)).
Masholie involved the refusal of a court to permit a party to intervene in a proceeding to assert claims that had previously been adjudicated unfavorably, and that, in
any event, were barred by the doctrine of laches. The case appears, therefore, to
have been an exercise of nothing more than the court's ordinary power to deny a
motion on good grounds. Note also the discussion supra at note 231 and accompanying text, concerning the opinion in Liberty Title and Trust Co. v. Plews, 6 N.J.
7
28, 77 A.2d 219 (1950), in which the court held that the pre-194 chancery courts'
authority to award counsel fees was abrogated by the adoption of the court rule
limiting awards to circumstances defined therein.
258 Pressler, supra note 102, R. 4:46-5 (b), Comment at 1034.
259 Id. at R. 4:46-6. It is unclear what distinction is being made in this rule between a factual contention "raised in bad faith . . . with knowledge that it was a
palpable sham" and on that is "predicated on facts known or which should have
been known by him to be false," as there are no reported cases construing the rule.
The commentary does not provide any illumination. A "sham" pleading is one that
is false in fact. See Goldberg v. Fisher, 11 N.J. Misc. 657, 168 A. 232 (N.J. 1933). See
also Risinger, supra note 8 at 26-29. A "palpable" sham presumably is one that is
easily perceived to be false. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 849
(1984) (defining "palpable" as "easily perceptible"). The only apparent difference
between the two stated elements is that the first requires knowledge of the falsity,
while the second requires either actual knowledge of the falsity or constructive
knowledge. (Although a "palpable sham" might be so apparent that one may be
charged with constructive knowledge of the falsity, rendering the two elements of
the rule identical.).
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general subject of attorney fee awards "as a sanction for so-called
frivolous matters.1 2 60 The comment expresses the court's fear

that sanctions might chill the assertion of meritorious claims, increase the volume of litigation and result in disparate enforcement and application. 26 '
The supreme court recently reiterated its opinion on the
subject of attorney fee awards in Satellite Gateway Communications,
Inc. v. Musi Dining Car Co. 26 2 The court's per curiam opinion

briefly reviewed the history of attorney fee awards and reaffirmed
the policy that "unless legal fees are authorized by statute, court
Rule, or contract, they are not recoverable.- 263 In a footnote,
however, the court referred to its decision in Ventron, which permitted an award of attorney fees as damages in a tort action. 2 6
B.

The New Jersey Supreme Court's constitutional authority over the

discipline of attorneys
The constitutional provision conferring authority on the
The Comment is worth quoting at length:
As made clear by the 1983 Report of the Civil Practice Committee, see
Ill N.J.L.J. Index page 670 (1983), there is still substantial concern
and hesitation in generally allowing counsel fees as a sanction for socalled frivolous matters. Most significantly, such a practice is regarded as having a potentially chilling effect on the assertion of meritorious claims and defenses. It is also believed that such a provision
would add greatly to the volume of litigation since a party potentially
subject to such an award would clearly have the right to attempt to
demonstrate in an evidential hearing that while the claim or defense
was unsuccessful, it was nevertheless not frivolous and was asserted in
good faith. In short, it was the [Civil Practice] Committee's conclusion that there are grave problems in a broad rule, which would necessarily involve the risk of restoration of the pre-1948 system of
inequities and iniquities which characterized counsel fee awards and
which would raise the corollary problems of inevitable disparity in enforcement and application, the favoritism and corruption which such a
rule can breed, and the use of a counsel fee sanction for calendar control purposes. The Committee was thus of the view that to whatever
extent calendar control considerations require solicitude, they should
be dealt with directly and not by imposing burdens which advantage
particular economic classes of litigants.
Pressler, supra note 102, at R. 4:46-5, Comment at 1035.
261 Id.
262 110 N.J. 280, 540 A.2d 1267 (1988). The case involved the construction of a
commercial landlord-tenant agreement that provided for an award of attorney fees.
The court reaffirmed the principle that parties may contractually agree to an award
of attorney fees, but held that the agreement at issue did not provide for such an
award under the circumstances presented. Id.
263 Id. at 285, 540 A.2d at 1270.
264 Id. at 285-86 n.2, 540 A.2d 1270 n.2.
260
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supreme court over the admission and discipline of attorneys has
generated fewer opinions than the rulemaking authority, but it
has also given rise to conflicts between the court and the legislature on the scope of the court's authority. Not surprisingly, the
tug-of-war between court and legislature on subjects related to
the court's authority over discipline of attorneys began in the
Vanderbilt era. Decided in 1955, Toft v. Ketchum 265 involved a
malicious use of process action brought by an attorney whose client had filed an ethics complaint, which the supreme court had
previously dismissed. The defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that a malicious use of process action could
not be predicated on the institution of a non-judicial proceeding,
and the motion was granted. 66 On appeal, the court upheld the
dismissal on other grounds, with Chief Justice Vanderbilt explaining that "the filing of a complaint with an ethics and grievance committee is privileged and an attorney cannot' predicate a
malicious prosecution action or similar suit upon it. "267
In response to Toft, the legislature passed a statute expressly
permitting attorneys subjected to baseless ethics complaints to
bring malicious use of process actions.2 68 For over twenty-five
years, no case squarely presented the issue of the statute's constitutionality to the supreme court.269 In 1984, however, the court
18 N.J. 280, 113 A.2d 671 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 887-88 (1955)
Id. at 283, 113 A.2d at 673.
267 Id. at 287, 113 A.2d at 675. JusticeJacobs concurred in the judgment of dismissal of the defendant's action under the facts presented, but wrote an opinion
that essentially disagreed with the majority opinion on the grounds that attorneys
should not be afforded lesser judicial protection from false attacks than members of
other professions, and that an action for malicious use of process was so limited
that it was unlikely to "discourage any ethics complaints which ought justly be
made." Id. at 290-91, 113 A.2d at 677 (Jacobs,J., concurring). JusticeJacobs noted
that the action for malicious prosecution had developed gradually because "it had
to make its way between two competing principles-the freedom of action that
every man should have in bringing violators to justice and the necessity for checking 'lying accusations of innocent people.' "Id. at 291, 113 A.2d at 677 (citing WINFIELD, TORTS 747 (6th ed. 1954) (Jacobs, J., concurring). Justices Wachenfeld and
Burling dissented. Justice Wachenfeld expressed the view that an attorney was in a
position to suffer more than most other professionals from a false and malicious
accusation of unprofessional conduct. Wachenfeld could discern no policy reason
for depriving an attorney of the right to obtain redress for the harm suffered. The
justice suggested that the legitimacy of the disciplinary process would be compromised if it became a "privileged sanctuar[y] to carry on personal vendettas and
excursions of ill will .... " Id. at 293, 113 A.2d at 678 (Wachenfeld, J., dissenting).
268 See L. 1956, c. 122, codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:47A-1 (West Supp. 1991).
269 In Friedland v. Podhoretz, 174 N.J. Super. 73, 415 A.2d 381 (Law Div. 1980),
the court upheld the statute against a constitutional challenge, finding no conflict
with the court's power to discipline attorneys.
265

266
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appointed a committee to study the attorney disciplinary system,
and the committee, in a divided vote, proposed a rule reinstating
the Tofit principle. 270 The court heard oral argument on the proposed rule and voted 4-3 to adopt it. In its written opinion on
the matter, In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants,27 '
Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz concluded that the prospect,
"however remote," that the possibility of retaliatory litigation
might deter a client from bringing a complaint, sufficiently supported the policy of immunity.272 Despite the conflict between
the new rule and the existing statute, the court reasoned that it
"simply cannot in the least abdicate its responsibility to exercise
exclusive power over the disciplining of attorneys. 2 75 In dissent, Justice Robert L. Clifford expressed an inclination to agree
with the majority that the court possessed the power to enact the
immunity rule, but proposed a policy of continued deference to
the legislative judgment embodied in the statute.274
The approach to legislation that was advocated in Justice
Clifford's dissent in Toft had constituted the majority view only
three years earlier in Knight v. City of Margate, 75 which involved
the application of the conflict of interest provisions of the legislation regulating casinos to members of the judicial branch. The
Knight court upheld the statute's explicit application to members
of the judiciary, holding that the existence of supreme court authority over judicial ethics did not preclude "the lawful and reasonable exercise of the powers of other branches of government
even as that might impinge upon the Court's constitutional con270 In re Hearing on Immunity for Ethics Complainants, 96 N.J. 669, 672-73, 477
A.2d 339, 341 (1984).
271 See id.
272 Id. at 675, 477 A.2d at 342 (1984). The Chief Justice commented that "[w]e
ordinarily do our very best to harmonize our constitutional powers with the apparently conflicting will of the Legislature." Id. at 677-78, 477 A.2d at 343 (citing
Knight v. Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 391, 431 A.2d 833 (1978)).
273 Id. at 678, 477 A.2d at 343.
274 96 N.J. at 679-81, 477 A.2d at 344-45 (Clifford, J., dissenting). Justices Pollock and Garibaldi joined the dissent. Justice Clifford's opinion expressed approval
of the approach taken in Friedland v. Podhoretz, 174 N.J. Super. 73, 415 A.2d 381
(Law Div. 1980), and quoted extensively from Justice Jacobs's dissent in Toft. Justice Clifford commented that "[a] healthy respect for the Legislature, whose competence to make policy judgments concerning immunities no on questions,
warrants our deferring to the legislative determination as expressed in [the statute].
This is not the field on which to risk a confrontation with the Legislature-a confrontation predicated on the entirely unwarranted assumption that lawyers, at least
as perceived by the public, are a shifty lot." Id. at 681, 477 A.2d at 345 (Clifford,J.,
dissenting).
275 86 N.J. 374, 431 A.2d 833 (1981).
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The court made it clear that toler-

ance of legislation impinging on its constitutional interests
"turn[s] upon the legitimacy of the governmental purpose of that
action and the nature and extent of its encroachment on judicial
prerogatives and interests. 277 In Knight, the legislative interest
was the objective of the conflicts of interest law "[t]o ensure pro278
priety and preserve public confidence" in government.
C. Does the frivolous claims statute impinge upon the New Jersey
Supreme Court's constitutional authority?
In light of the foregoing discussion regarding the New Jersey
Supreme Court's attitude towards attorney fee awards, as well as
the court's adjudicative and rulemaking activity in this area, one
is hesitant to predict whether the court will regard the frivolous
claims statute as an imposition on its rulemaking or disciplinary
authority. It seems less likely that the frivolous claims statute will
be found to impinge upon the court's authority concerning the
discipline of attorneys than upon its general rulemaking authority. As the court in Fagas observed, the statute does not expressly
authorize awards against attorneys and thus it has no direct effect
on attorney discipline. To the extent that the statute has a collateral effect on attorney disciplinary proceedings and malpractice
liability, the statute's policy - reducing the number of unmeritorious civil actions - is consistent with the policy of the attorney disciplinary rules. A court employing the Knight approach to
the constitutionality of the statute might be swayed by the coincidence of these policy goals.
The supreme court's general rulemaking authority, however,
is another matter. The court in Fagas concluded that the statute
does not impinge upon the court's authority to make rules of
practice and procedure, finding that the statute fits within the exception in subsection (a)(8) of New Jersey Court Rule 4:42-9,
which provides for awards of attorney fees where "permitted by
statute." The court interpreted subsection (a)(8) as permissive of
legislation on the subject, commenting that if the supreme court
found that the statute interfered with the functioning of the
courts, "it can amend the court rules accordingly.

' 279

Although the Fagas approach to this issue offers the advan276
277
278
279

Id. at 391, 431 A.2d at 842.
Id.
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-12(b) (West 1986)).
Fagas v. Scott, 251 N.J. Super. 169, 211, 597 A.2d 571, 592 (Law Div. 1991).
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tage of simplicity, it fails to take into account the essential difference between the frivolous claims statute and the other existing
statutes permitting counsel fee awards. These enactments, while
numerous, each address discrete circumstances in which attorney
fees are permitted; they do not involve a wholesale grant of authority to make attorney fee awards in a broad class of cases.2 80
The literal approach of Fagas also does not consider the supreme
court's frequent expressions of the strong policy considerations
that weigh against a generalized rule penalizing unmeritorious
litigation. The court continually has expressed its reluctance to
adopt a general rule that might deter the filing of meritorious
claims and that might give rise to collateral proceedings to determine the appropriateness of attorney fee awards in cases where a
baseless claim is found.2 8 ' Contrary to the Fagas court's suggestion, the provisions of the frivolous claims statute do not merely
2 82
"fill[] in the gaps in the court rules concerning sanctions."
The "gaps" in the court rules constitute a deliberate withholding
of authority by the supreme court, reflective of its conscious
choice not to permit wholesale awards of attorney fees. Thus,
the frivolous claims statute reflects a legislative policy judgment
that is directly contrary to the judgment of the supreme court on
the same issue. From this perspective, the frivolous claims statute presents precisely the same kind of conflict between statute
and court rule at issue in Winberry and Otis Elevator, notwithstanding the court rule's permissive language. A declaration that the
statute is an unconstitutional infringement on the court's
rulemaking powers is certainly supportable under the authority
of those cases.
V.

CONCLUSION

An undeniably meritorious goal underlies the frivolous
claims statute: reduction in the assertion of meritless claims and
reimbursement of parties for attorney fees and expenses incurred in defending against such claims. The statute as presently
drafted, however, is not the ideal vehicle for achieving this goal.
The statute's standard of frivolousness is subject to overapplication. The fact that it has been applied to claims it was not in280 See Kevin P. Duffy, 201 New Jersey Counsel Fee Statutes, 127 N.J.L.J. 340 (Feb. 7,

1991).
281 See supra notes 236 and 244.

282 251 N.J. Super. at 210, 597 A.2d at 584-86 (quoting Gary D. Nissenbaum and
Nancy Lem, Stop, Look and Listen: Selected Defenses to the New Jersey Frivolous Lawsuit
Statute, 20 SETON HALL L. REV. 184, 191 (1989)).
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tended to encompass - those that are factually, rather than
legally, baseless - evidences what may be an over-enthusiasm on
the part of the trial courts and prevailing attorneys toward the
sanctioning of losing litigants. There is an inherent danger of
unfairly second-guessing a litigant's decision to file suit when a
determination of frivolousness necessarily takes place after the
rejection of the litigant's claim on the merits. Moreover, the potential for compounding trial court errors in assessing the merits
of litigant's claims is great - a court may erroneously reject a
litigant's claim on the merits, for example, then find that the litigant "knew or should have known" that the claim was baseless,
and award attorney fees under the statute. The potential chilling
effect of this type of second-guessing is considerable. A comparison of the results in Semexant v. MIL Limited and McKeown-Brand v.
Trump Castle Hotel and Casino illustrates this concern. The Semexant
court found that a legal theory which had been definitively rejected by the state's highest court nevertheless was not frivolous
because one dissenting justice and a number of other jurisdictions recognized the theory as valid. In McKeown-Brand, the
plaintiff's attorney raised a legal theory not yet expressly rejected
by the New Jersey Supreme Court but recognized in other jurisdictions. Perhaps because the theory was raised inartfully, and
belatedly, the plaintiff's claim was not only rejected, but found to
be frivolous. If the supreme court upholds the sanction imposed
in McKeown-Brand, only the most well-heeled plaintiff is likely to
risk a future attempt to argue that New Jersey courts should recognize that an employer has an obligation of good faith and fair
dealing with respect to its employees.
The statute could also benefit from some legislative revision
to clarify its standard of frivolousness. It is clear from the legislative history that the statute was not intended to encompass factually baseless claims, but the generalized language used in
subsection (b)(2) has permitted courts unaware of the legislative
history to misinterpret the statute's intended scope. Moreover,
the relationship between the two subsections of the statute is unclear. Subsection (b)(1) appears to be superfluous. It should
either be eliminated to avoid confusion over the statute's intended scope or, alternatively, it should be amended to expressly
cover claims based on knowingly false allegations of fact. Any
statutory amendments should deal cautiously with the issue of
factual baselessness. The inclusion of factually baseless claims
should be limited to those advanced with knowledge of their fal-
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sity, as the courts should not be burdened with adjudicating applications for awards based on an allegation that a party has
inadvertently rather than knowingly advanced a factually baseless
claim.
On the issue of constitutionality, the New Jersey Supreme
Court should follow the Knight approach and defer to the implicit
and legitimate legislative judgment that the goal of discouraging
unmeritorious claims warrants the imposition of attorney fee
awards in the circumstances outlined in the statute. The frivolous claims statute demonstrates the inherent inutility of Chief
Justice Vanderbilt's Winberry distinction between the categories
of substance and procedure. The statute clearly implicates both
of these inherently overlapping categories. The court should
abandon Winberry's "winner take all" approach to the respective
responsibilities of the judicial and legislative branches over the
functioning of the court system, and recognize the Legislature's
legitimate role in this area.
The court should also consider adopting complementary
court rules to regulate the procedural aspects of applications for
awards under the statute. The court could well consider a parallel court rule permitting attorney fee awards directly against attorneys in appropriate cases. Such a rule would not conflict with
the statute nor with its overall policy of reducing the assertion of
meritless claims. Moreover, it would mitigate the effects on clients of an attorney's failure to assess properly the legal basis for a
claim. The court could also appropriately consider the federal
experience with Rule 11 as an indicator of the kinds of problems
that may arise under the frivolous claims statute. While the frivolous claims statute is not a Rule 11 clone, the experience under
the federal rule should be considered to the extent that the two
enactments' provisions are similar or might have similar effects.
The proposal of the Committee on Civil Rules to modify Federal
Rule 11 should constitute a particularly fruitful source of ideas in
this regard. Significantly, the proposed amendments are intended to reduce the frequency of Rule 11 motions. One device
designed to accomplish this purpose is the inclusion in the proposal of a "safe harbor" provision that affords a litigant twentyone days after being served with papers requesting sanctions
under the rule, to withdraw the claim that is alleged to violate the
rule. If the claim is withdrawn, no sanctions will be imposed.283
An analogous provision requiring a party who intends to
283

Proposed Rules, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
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seek an award under the frivolous claims statute to notify formally the opposing party, not merely the opposing party's attorney, that a claim is alleged to be frivolous, and granting the
opposing party the opportunity to withdraw the claim without
penalty, would not be inconsistent with the statute's language that a court "may" award attorney fees and costs if a claim is
found to be frivolous. Notice should also be taken of the proposal that would require a specific finding that a represented party
is responsible for a Rule 11 violation before sanctions could be
imposed on the party rather than on the party's attorney.28 4 Because the New Jersey statute permits an award only against a
party, it would be particularly appropriate to construe the statute
as requiring an explicit finding that the party, not merely the
party's attorney, in fact "knew or should have known" that a
claim was baseless, rather than to rely on an unstated agency theory that an attorney's knowledge is imputed to the client.
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 64-65
(1991).
284 Id.

